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We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain
management protocol of Amazon Web Services’ KMS (Key Man-
agement Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS
and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of
AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of
encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely
implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under stan-
dard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in
the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt devel-
opment to date.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Today’s cloud services use sophisticated distributed architectures
and algorithms to make data highly available and durable. To im-
prove security, data at rest is typically encrypted, and decrypted
only when/where necessary. The encryption keys themselves must
be similarly durable and available; however, directly providing all
keys towhichever service needs to use them unnecessarily increases
the attack surface. For the most sensitive keys, it is more prudent to
encapsulate them within a separate distributed encryption service.
Such a service allows the creation of new keys, and uses these
keys to encrypt and decrypt data, but does not expose the keys
themselves to clients.
The subject of this paper is the AWS domain management proto-
col (henceforth abbreviated DMP), a distributed encryption service
underlying the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Key Management Ser-
vice (KMS [5]). AWS KMS, a core component of the AWS cloud, lets
AWS customers create and manage encryption keys, providing a
consistent view of encryption/decryption operations across AWS
services, and controlling their use through AWS Identity and Access
Management (IAM).
1
The widespread usage of AWS KMS and the
central role of the DMP justifies a high-assurance security proof,
leveraging recent developments in computer-aided cryptography
such as [3, 4, 7].
In this paper, we present a fully mechanized, concrete proof of
security of the DMP. Informally, the proof shows that the DMP
provides an idealized encryption service.
Security goal. The DMP is designed to protect the confidentiality
of data encrypted under domain keys and guarantee the correct
operation of the interface it provides, even in the presence of a
malicious individual interfering with the inner workings of the sys-
tem. In particular, we consider an adversary that can commission
and decommission hosts and HSMs (Hardware Security Modules),
assumed to be under adversarial control, and manipulate (insert,
delete, modify) messages exchanged between system entities. Our
1
Within AWS KMS, the DMP is used only to encrypt and decrypt customer master
keys, the roots of the customer key hierarchies. The use of these master keys, and the
design of KMS (outside of the DMP itself) is described in [5].
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goal is to show that such an adversary cannot gain further advan-
tage than possibly causing the system to go unresponsive.
Formally, this security goal is defined using an ideal functionality
and the real-vs-ideal world paradigm, similarly to the Universal
Composability [14] framework. We prove that the DMP is indis-
tinguishable from an idealized encryption service to an arbitrary
external environment that can collude with a malicious insider
adversary. This formalization captures precisely the security that
the rest of AWS KMS needs from the DMP.
Main Theorem. Our main theorem states that the DMP behaves
like an ideal authenticated encryption service. The theorem rules
out attacks from arbitrary computationally bounded adversaries,
under standard cryptographic assumptions for digital signatures,
hash-functions and encryption schemes. Formally, we prove that
the probability of breaking the protocol is smaller than
2 ·
(
(qops + qhid) · ϵsig + qdom · ϵaead + ϵcr + ϵmrpke + ϵcoll
)
,
where qops and qhid are upper bounds on the number of human op-
erators and HSMs in the system, respectively; qdom upper-bounds
the number of domain keys; ϵsig, ϵaead and ϵcr denote the maxi-
mum probabilities of breaking a standard signature, authenticated
encryption and cryptographic hash function, respectively; ϵmrpke
denotes the maximum probability of breaking a multi-recipient
variant of public-key encryption; and ϵcoll is a small statistical term
related to collisions of signature verification keys. The security of
cryptographic signatures, hashes, and authenticated encryption im-
plies that all of the epsilons above (and hence the total probability
of breaking the protocol) are negligible. A more precise statement
of the concrete cryptographic setting and bound can be found in
Sections 4 and 5.
Formalization. The proof is fully machine-checked in EasyCrypt [6],
a proof assistant for cryptographic proofs. The development is
15K lines of code (loc), of which 500 loc comprise the protocol
specification. Besides being the largest EasyCrypt development
to date, the proof combines game-hopping techniques that are
standard in cryptographic proofs, and rich inductive reasoning that
is standard in program verification. The machine-checked proof is
novel for the following reasons:
• We formalize a notion of key secrecy for KMS DMP in the style of
cryptographic APIs [23] and extend prior work in this area by i.
addressing a substantially more complex (distributed) API; and ii.
making explicit which assumptions on the behaviour of human
operators are necessary (as otherwise trivial breaks would be
possible), whilst excluding all non-trivial breaks as in prior work
by reducing to standard cryptographic assumptions.
• We relate the above definition of security with a real-vs-ideal
world security definition for encryption services, by proving
a (reusable) general composition result for combining crypto-
graphic key management APIs with AEAD schemes. Our result-
ing top-level security theorem establishes that KMS DMP is as
good as an ideal authenticated encryption service in the specified
trust model.
• The machine-checked proof follows best proof engineering prac-
tices and favors reusable components, breaking down the verifi-
cation effort in three types of steps:
i. reusable results that lift standard cryptographic assumptions
on signatures and hash functions to idealized versions that
permit reasoning symbolically about complex invariants on
authenticated data structures;
ii. use rich inductive reasoning to prove that intricate authentica-
tion invariants hold in the security experiments, and rewrite
(slice) the code of the security games to make explicit the split
between data which is under adversarial control (due to trivial
strategies that do not contradict the security claim) and data
which is outside of the adversary’s reach; and
iii. build on the previous results to conduct a game hopping proof
that, first, idealizes digital signatures and hash functions, accou-
ting for concrete (negligible) security losses; then modularly
uses the authentication invariants to perform security experi-
ment slicing; and finally reduces the key-secrecy property to
the security of multi-recipient encryption.
Paper Structure. In Section 2 we give a bird’s eye view of our ap-
proach and provide a road-map for the paper, before moving on to
more technical sections. In Section 3 we give a detailed description
of the DMP and of its formalization in EasyCrypt. Then, in Section 4
we formalize the security model that we have adopted and in which
we have proved security of the DMP. In Section 5 we describe the
machine-checked security proof. Section 6 gives an overview of the
improvements to EasyCrypt that were developed during the project.
Section 8 contains a summary of related work, and Section 9 the
concluding remarks.
2 OVERVIEW
In this section we present an overview of the DMP goals and inter-
face, and then outline the structure and contents of the EasyCrypt
model and proof (shown in Figure 1).
DMP Concepts. The fundamental unit of security in the DMP is
a domain. Each domain provides an independent distributed en-
cryption functionality using a combination of machines and people
(collectively referred to as entities) which may change over time.
Each entity can participate in multiple domains.
Concretely, a domain is given by its entities, the rules governing
the domain, and a set of (symmetric) domain keys. The entities
are of three types: HSMs, human operators, and front-end hosts.
HSMs are the inner security boundary of the DMP, and have a
limited web-based API and no other active physical interfaces to
their operational state. Sensitive cryptographic materials of an HSM
are stored only in volatile memory, and are erased when the HSM
exits operational state, including shutdowns and resets. Domain
keys likewise appear in the clear only in the volatile memory of
HSMs in the domain.
The goal of the DMP is to govern the operations on domain keys
and to manage membership of HSMs in a domain, as well as au-
thorizing operators to act on a domain. HSMs do not communicate
directly with each other. Thus, a central function of the DMP is to
synchronize the domain state between domain participants. For this
purpose, all information about a domain state, including its domain
keys, is transferred and stored in a domain token. A domain token
contains encryptions of the domain keys, and is authenticated in
order to bind these encryptions to the domain state.
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Domain state is modified through quorum-authenticated com-
mands issued by authorized operators for that domain. Changes
to domain state include modifying the list of trusted participants
in the domain, modifying the set of quorum rules, and periodi-
cally rotating domain keys. Rules on quorum-signed commands
are designed to mitigate attacks by colluding dishonest operators,
namely attacks that might allow such operators to bypass the secu-
rity protections provided by the HSMs. By requiring authorization
from n operators from the domain, the security of operations that
add new entities to a domain is anchored on the assumption that
a quorum of n operators from the domain will always contain at
least one honest operator that follows the protocol, where n is a
security parameter for the domain. A more detailed description of
the domain management operations is included in Section 3, along
with their formalization in EasyCrypt.
DMP Implementation. Not counting the crypto libraries, the imple-
mentation of the DMP protocol is spread across some 16.5K lines
of Java code. The conformance of this code to the protocol level
design is checked via integration tests. Additionally, a formal code
validation mechanism has been built using an extension to a taint
tracking type system (the Checker Framework, [19]). The checked
property is a necessary condition for conformance to the protocol:
a domain key must not be returned as part of the return value of an
API call without first being encrypted by another key. This check
is performed continuously, every time the KMS codebase changes,
and it required only 323 manual annotations to the codebase.
DMP Functional Interface. The DMP provides an encryption func-
tionality for each of its domains. Different domains can vary in the
entities that they trust, their tolerance for dishonesty, and other
security-related parameters. For each domain, the provided en-




• New(hdl) creates a new domain key within the domain and as-
sociates it to a key identifier hdl. The result indicates whether
the operation was successful.
• Enc(hdl,msg, ad) uses the domain key associated with identifier
hdl to encrypt the payloadmsgwith associated data ad, returning
the ciphertext.
• Dec(hdl, cph, ad) uses the domain key associated with identifier
hdl to decrypt ciphertext cph with associated data ad and, if
successful, returns the recovered plaintext.
The goal of the DMP security proof is to show that the DMP pro-
vides an idealized version of this interface (with a small probability
of error). This ideal interface is close to that of standard Authen-
ticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), as detailed in
Section 4, except that operations might fail (with no effect), as one
might expect in a distributed system.
The EasyCrypt security proof consists of three layers.
3
The top
layer gives a real-vs-ideal world security definition for the DMP
and shows that security of a DMP domain in this model follows
2
This interface mentions only domain keys, so the functionality gives a simple way
to separate the security provided by the DMP from its use in the rest of AWS KMS.
3
Note that the scale of the proof does not increase the trusted base, as it is fully
machine-checked by EasyCrypt – indeed, this is the main motivation for machine-
checked provable security; the guarantee that the proof justifies the formalized security




















Figure 1: Structure of the machine-checked proof
from the secrecy of its domain keys. The next layer shows that the
DMP does indeed preserve the secrecy of domain keys of so-called
“honest" domains (described in Section 3), assuming the secure
implementation of the low-level cryptographic constructions used
to create domain tokens. The bottom layer shows the security of
these low-level constructions.
Proof: Real-vs-ideal World Security.At the top layer of the EasyCrypt
proof lies a formal definition of security for encryption services
supported by key management protocols such as the DMP (detailed
in Section 5.1). The definition follows the real-vs-ideal paradigm of
the UC framework (in fact, our proof can be seen as being carried out
in a specific hybrid model in the UC framework, which we discuss
in detail in Appendix A). Intuitively, the ideal functionality leaks
nothing to the (adversarial) environment except the length of the
data being encrypted, and implements decryption by maintaining a
table mapping pairs (cph, ad) to messages. Ideal encryption always
returns encryptions of 0
ℓ
, where ℓ is the encrypted data length,
and adds a new entry to this table; decryption simply does a lookup
from the table (rather than calling the decryption function).
At this level we reduce the real-vs-ideal world security of the
DMP to an indistinguishability-based security property that cap-
tures the secrecy of domain keys. This means that in the lower
levels of the proof we do not need to reason about how domain
keys are used; it suffices to prove that the DMP keeps domain keys
hidden from the attacker’s view.
Proof: Indistinguishability-based security. The second layer of results
proves that the protocol hides all information about domain keys
from the adversary’ view. This is formalized as a cryptographic
API [23] that guarantees domain key secrecy. The model captures
the actions of a malicious insider adversary by allowing the do-
main management operations to consist of multiple adversarially
orchestrated steps. The main challenge in this proof, formalized
using the game-hopping technique, is to establish the invariants
that govern the state of security experiments in each hop. These in-
variants combine properties that arise from standard cryptographic
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Figure 2: High-level view of the DMP.
assumptions (e.g., absence of collisions and signature forgeries)
with the inductive argument that justifies the soundness of the do-
main update operations carried out by honest operators, HSMs and
hosts. It is by the joint action of these two types of guarantees that
the domain management policy excludes dishonest entities from
explicitly obtaining information on domain keys. The proof at this
layer reduces the security of the API to the security of lower-level
abstractions, all of which are formalized in the indistinguishability
style, in order to facilitate the game-hopping technique. The details
are discussed in Section 5.3.
Proof: Low-level abstractions. The lower layer of security results de-
fines idealized versions of digital signature services, hash maps and
certification of identity keys by human operators. It also contains
proofs that these abstractions are indistinguishable from real-world
instantiations down to standard cryptographic assumptions, which
can then be used to make concrete the bounds in the theorems
established at the higher layers in the development. At this level,
we also formalize the specific flavor of (multi-recipient) public-key
encryption that is used by the DMP.
This lower layer in the proof is meant to modularize various
components, for three purposes: 1) lifting assumptions formalized
as bad events, such as unforgeability and collision resistance, to
indistinguishability definitions, allowing the higher-level parts of
the proof to be solely based on indistinguishability game hops; 2) al-
lowing for reuse of the abstractions across the project (e.g., we reuse
the signature abstraction for both operator signatures and HSM
signatures); and 3) allow for multiple instantiations of the same
underlying primitive (e.g., an encryption scheme with different
constructions). This part of the proof is presented in Section 5.2.
3 KMS DOMAIN MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
3.1 Detailed Description
A high-level operational view of the DMP is presented in Figure 2
(reproduced from [5]). Operators issue commands, HSMs manipu-
late the contents of domain tokens, and coordinator servers propa-
gate updated domain tokens to each HSM in a domain to keep their
domain states approximately synchronized (the latter are not shown
and assumed for the purpose of the proof to be under adversarial
control).
We now describe the core concepts and mechanisms involved
in the DMP at the level of the mathematical model of the protocol
that forms the basis of the formal proof of security. We begin by
introducing the notion of a domain state, the different entities in the
system and what assumptions we make about their behavior; we
then explain the roles of these entities in domain state transitions,
and conclude with an intuitive explanation of the security rationale
underlying the design.
Protocol entities and assumed behavior. The DMP is implemented
using three types of entities: HSMs, hosts, and operators. Each entity
is identified with its identity (signature verification) key. A genuine
entity is (the identity key of) anHSM/Host/Operator that behaves as
specified by the DMP. A domain might include non genuine identity
keys of any entity type, e.g. keys created by amalicious entity. HSMs
perform the actual encryption and decryption operations,
45
and are
the only entities allowed to manipulate domain keys in cleartext.
Operators are responsible for certifying identity keys: they sign
statements claiming that a given identity key represents a genuine
HSM, host or operator.
6 Honest operators only sign statements
that are true, i.e. if an honest operator claims a key is that of a
genuine HSM, the key is in fact genuine. Conversely, dishonest
operators, while themselves genuine, might sign statements that
are false. Note that we assume only that an honest operator can
tell whether another operator is genuine, not whether he is honest.
Genuine but dishonest operators model insider threats, possibly
colluding with external adversaries. Non-genuine operators model
arbitrary rogue identity keys that the adversary may also create in
its attack. For the purpose of this paper, the quorum rule is defined
by a security parameter n, which describes the minimum number
of operators of the domain that must authorize an update over
the domain state. Our security analysis is anchored on a global
assumption that any set of n genuine operators contains at least
one honest operator that follows the protocol. For example, a rule
imposing that a quorum consists of a set of at least n = 2 operators
from the domain guarantees that it requires at least two dishonest
operators of the domain to break security.
Finally, hosts are the service endpoints. Although the actions of
hosts in AWS KMS are more complex, our analysis focuses on the
crucial role of honest hosts in directing cryptographic operations
to honest domains:
7
as entry points in the system, hosts keep track
of domain states and check that they are updated consistently with
the domain management rules by HSMs. (Although we have not
formalized this, in Appendix B we discuss how our proof implies
security in a model where corrupt hosts are considered.)
4
What we call HSMs are, in AWS KMS, running instances of FIPS 140-2 certified
hardware security modules. They generate fresh identity and agreement key pairs
when they boot, and store them only in volatile memory; the instance is effectively
destroyed when power is lost. This simplifies physical protection — it suffices to
guarantee that the machine cannot be physically attacked without losing power.
5
In our protocol model, HSMs are conceptually stateless beyond their identity and
agreement key pairs. In AWS KMS, HSMs maintain the current domain state for each
domain they operate on, allowing their behavior to be more tightly controlled. This
provides defense in depth, and potentially allows the proof of additional security
properties not described here.
6
In AWS KMS, these statements are actually commands to perform particular actions,
such as a command requesting an HSM to add or remove HSMs or operators from a
domain; such a command implicitly carries with it the certification from the command
signers that the added entities are genuine. Note also that operators represent human
operators, which play many additional security roles in the system; we describe only
as much as is needed to justify the presented security proof.
7
Note that it is always safe to add domain-local secrets that appear only encrypted
by keys of the domain. This can be done by allowing such secrets to only be created
by an HSM of the domain (that immediately encrypts the new secret under a domain
key), and to be re-encrypted from one domain key to another domain key of the same
domain. For example, in AWS KMS, customer master keys are treated in this way, and
hosts are also responsible for issuing the commands that manage the creation and
usage of such keys.
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Domain States, Tokens and Key Usage. A domain state logically
consists of two parts: 1) a domain trust describing the administrative
state of the domain—its entities and rules of operation—and 2) the
actual domain keys. The trust components include a unique name
of the domain, the set of entities of each type treated as genuine for
the domain and the agreement keys for each HSM in the domain.
The trust also includes a set of quorum rules defining what sets
of operators (quorums) are considered trustworthy. Domain state
modifications must be authorized by one of these quorums. Since
the trust state of a domain can evolve over time (as operators, HSMs,
and hosts are added and removed from the domain), the trust also
includes the cryptographic fingerprint (hash) of the previous trust
from which it was derived (by means of a trust update). Domain
keys are kept secret from all entities other than the HSMs of the
domain, whereas the domain trust only has to be authenticated.
The concrete trust representation is signed by an HSM of the trust.
To provide the encryption functionality of a domain, its HSMs
need access to the domain keys, which should not be exposed to
other entities. To allow this, the domain state is concretely repre-
sented by a domain token signed by an HSM of the trust, which
includes an encryption of the domain keys. This representation
authenticates the state and binds the encrypted data to the trust;
domain keys are decryptable only by the HSMs of the trust.
To allow encryptions between HSMs of a domain, each HSM
has a long-term Diffie-Hellman agreement key pair. It certifies its
(public) agreement key as its own by signing it with its identity
key. To encrypt the domain keys for the other HSMs in a domain,
an HSM first encrypts them under an ephemeral symmetric key.
It then generates an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key pair, uses DH
agreement with this key pair and each of the agreement keys of
the domain HSMs to compute a shared secret with each HSM,
uses a key derivation function (KDF) on each shared secret to pro-
duce a set of symmetric keys, each of which is used to encrypt the
ephemeral symmetric key. The result is a multi-recipient encryp-
tion of the domain keys to all the other HSMs in the domain based
on DHIES [1]. This scheme has performance advantages: cipher-
texts to all the HSMs in the domain take less bandwidth and can
be batch-generated faster. The final domain token includes all of
these encryptions, the public ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key, and
the domain trust, all signed by the HSM creating the token. When
an HSM receives a command (other than to create a new domain),
it also gets a domain token on which to operate
8
(see Figure 2); it
decrypts the domain token, and uses it to process the request.
Domain State Transitions. The security of a domain depends criti-
cally on all of the HSMs of a domain being genuine. For example, if
an adversary could somehow introduce an identity into a domain
for which he holds the private signing key, he could use this identity
to sign an agreement key for which he holds the private key, have
another member update the domain, and use his fake agreement
key to decrypt the new domain token, breaking security. How-
ever, the HSMs performing the domain update operations (adding
and removing entities) do not carry with them a state that allows
them to recognize the identity keys of genuine entities. Domain
8
In AWS KMS, these domain states are typically cached within the HSMs, rather
than being explicitly provided as part of a command. This provides slightly stronger
security guarantees, e.g. wrt state rollback.
updates where HSMs modify trusts therefore rely on authorizations
(attestations) of identity keys produced by operators, as follows.
An HSMwill sign a new trust with any set of entities and quorum
rules, if that trust is initial (i.e., has no predecessor fingerprint).9 To
modify an existing trust to create a new trust, an HSM checks that 1)
it is an HSM of the existing trust, and 2) every entity in the new trust
is either in the old trust or is certified (for the domain) by a quorum
of operators of the existing trust. If these checks are successful, it
creates and signs a new trust with the updated information, with
the fingerprint of the existing trust as predecessor of the new one.
A host processing requests for a domain maintains in his state a
trust for the domain; his commands can only be processed by HSMs
in the trust.
10
As the trust of a domain evolves, hosts update their
version of the trust. A host of a domain is initially given the initial
trust of the domain. A host updates to a new trust only if 1) the
predecessor fingerprint of new trust is the fingerprint of its current
trust, and 2) the new trust is signed by an HSM of its current trust.
Invariant: an honest trust stays honest. A trust is honest if and only
if its HSMs, hosts, and operators are all genuine, every quorum
of operators (as defined by its quorum rules) contains an honest
operator, and its predecessor trust (if any) is honest. A crucial
property of the DMP is that, if a domain is initially created with
an honest trust, then the domain will remain honest as updates
are performed by HSMs. Note that this guarantee is enforced even
though the HSM performing the updates keeps no state other than
its own signing and agreement keys:
11
such an HSM has no way
of distinguishing genuine operators from non-genuine ones, and it
depends on attestation by operators to identify genuine HSMs.
Intuitively, the trust honesty property is preserved by the fol-
lowing inductive reasoning, which we formalize in our machine-
checked proof. The base case is trivial. In the inductive step, an HSM
is asked to update an honest existing trust to a new trust, and it
performs checks (1-2) described above. By the quorum requirement
on honest trusts, any entity certified by a quorum in the existing
trust is guaranteed to be genuine. By check 2) above, the HSM will
therefore guarantee that all entities in the new trust are genuine. To
show that honesty is preserved it remains to prove that the quorum
requirement is satisfied by the new trust. This is guaranteed by
the global assumption on the security parameter n: since we just
proved all operators in the new trust must be genuine, it must be
the case that any subset of operators of size at least n contains at
least one honest operator. Thus, if the current trust is honest, the
successor trust (once signed by an HSM of the predecessor trust) is
also honest. By the observation of the last paragraph, the actions
of a host guarantee that if the host starts out with an honest trust,
the host trust will remain honest.
Allowing Dishonest Domains. The DMP presented here allows dis-
honest domains to share entities with honest domains. In AWS
KMS, this is prevented by having HSMs cache domain states, and
9
This corresponds to a domain creation request in AWS KMS.
10
Commands are in fact issued by first obtaining an ephemeral symmetric key token
generated by an HSM of the trust, with the plaintext key decryptable only using
either a domain key or by the host requesting the token. We do not describe this
communication mechanism in this paper.
11
Again, AWS KMS caches domain tokens, rather than them being explicitly provided
for updates; the DMP proof shows that this caching is not needed for the current
security proof.
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type HId. (∗ Identities of HSMs ∗)
type OpId. (∗ Identities of Operators ∗)
type HstId. (∗ Identities of Hosts ∗)
type DomId. (∗ Identities of Domains ∗)
(∗ Trust data (genuine HSMs) and metadata ∗)
type Fpr.
typeQuorum = OpId fset ∗ int.
typeMetadata =Quorum ∗ Fpr option ∗ HstId fset ∗ DomId.
type Trust = (HId fset) ∗Metadata.
(∗ Domain keys in plaintext and encrypted form ∗)
type Keys = (Handle,Key) fmap.
type EKeys = MCTxt.
(∗ Unwrapped domain token ∗)
type TkData = { td_inst: bool; td_trust: Trust; td_skeys: Keys; }.
(∗Wrapped domain token and trust ∗)
type TkWrapped = { tkw_ekeys: EKeys; tkw_signer: HId; tkw_sig: signature; }.
type Token = { tk_inst: bool; tk_trust: Trust; tk_wdata: TkWrapped; }.
Figure 3: EasyCrypt Definitions for Domain Tokens
using additional commands by which an HSM attests to its current
domains. This allows operators to check that an HSM is loaded
up with honest domain tokens, and so will never process requests
using dishonest domain tokens. The current proof shows that lock-
ing down the HSMs in this way is not needed to achieve domain
security. Note that the current proof nevertheless still applies to
the security of AWS KMS, since the latter’s stricter rules simply
restrict adversarial action.
3.2 Formalization in EasyCrypt
Background on EasyCrypt. EasyCrypt is an interactive proof assis-
tant for verifying the security of cryptographic constructions in the
computational model. EasyCrypt adopts the code-based approach,
in which primitives, security goals and hardness assumptions are
expressed as probabilistic programs. EasyCrypt uses formal tools
from program verification and programming languages to justify
cryptographic reasoning, providing several program logics. We now
describe the formalization of the DMP in EasyCrypt.
12
Trusts and Domain Tokens. Figure 3 shows the EasyCrypt declara-
tions for domain tokens. The HId type is a pair holding the signing
key of the HSM and its public agreement key. The OpId type is simply
the signing key for the human operator. Type TkWrapped corresponds
to signed data structures, which we reuse both for signed trusts and
signed domain tokens. Technically, this simplifies the writing of
invariants, as we only need to deal with one encoding function into
the domain of signature schemes. We then syntactically distinguish
(using bit tk_inst) installable signed trusts—only these can be installed
in hosts—from signed domain tokens that also carry domain keys.
Wrapping and Unwrapping. Figure 4 shows how we formalize in
EasyCrypt the operations carried out by HSMs to wrap (i.e., creat-
ing a data structure that is digitally signed and contains encrypted
domain keys) and unwrap (verifying authenticity and recover clear-
text domain keys) domain tokens. Operator checkToken performs con-
sistency checks on tokens and performs signature verification; in
particular, it also checks that the encrypted keys cph are encrypted
12
Notation: In EasyCrypt tup.1 denotes the first element of a tuple; notation is over-
loaded for fields in records, as in rec.field.
op proj_pks (hids: HId fset) : MPk = image snd hids.
(∗ Operator used for both unwrap and trust updates ∗)
op checkToken(inst : Installable, old new : Trust, tkw : TkWrapped) =
let (cphs, sid, sig) = (tkw.tkw_ekeys, tkw.tkw_signer, tkw.tkw_sig) in
let msg = encode_msg (new,cphs,sid,inst) in
verify(sid.1, msg, sig) ∧ proj_pks (tr_mems old) = fdom cphs ∧
sid ∈ tr_mems old.
proc wrap(hid : HId,td : TkData) : Token = {




ekeys←$ mencrypt (proj_pks mem) tag ptxt;
msg← encode_msg (trust, ekeys, hid, inst);
sig← SigSch.sign(hid.1, msg);
tkw← { tkw_ekeys = ekeys; tkw_signer = hid; tkw_sig = sig };
return { tk_inst = inst; tk_trust = trust; tk_wdata = tkw; };
}
proc unwrap(hid : HId, tk : Token) : TkData option = {
rtd← None;
(inst, trust, data)← (tk.tk_inst, tk.tk_trust, tk.tk_wdata);
(∗ Signer must be in trust: so we call check with trust as old ∗)
if (checkToken inst trust tk.tk_wdata ∧
hid ∈ tr_mems trust ∧ hid_in hid benc_keys) {
(ekey, dkey)← benc_keys[hid.1];
(tag, cphs)← (encode_tag trust, data.tkw_ekeys);
cph← cphs[ekey];
optxt← decrypt dkey tag cph;
if (optxt,None)
skeys← decode_ptxt optxt;




Figure 4: HSM Operations for Domain Token (un)wrapping.
to all HSM members of the trust (proj_pks(tr_mems old)=fdom cphs), and that
the signer is a member of the trust (sid ∈ tr_mems old).13
Encryption is formalized as tag-based multi-recipient public-
key encryption [8, 22]. Intuitively, this is a variant of public-key
encryption where one can provide multiple agreement keys to
the encryption algorithm, so that the resulting ciphertext can be
decrypted independently by multiple recipients using only their
individual private agreement keys. Encryption therefore takes a set
of public keys (type MPk), and we model ciphertexts as a map from
public keys to sub-ciphertexts that contain only the parts of the full
ciphertext that each recipient needs to decrypt. This abstraction
permits capturing the specific flavor of public-key encryption used
in the DMP: the multi-recipient syntax permits modeling schemes
that minimize bandwidth and encryption time via the reuse of
randomness across multiple ciphertexts. The construction is tag-
based, because it binds the ciphertext to the meta-data of the token
(parameter tag) thereby preventing an adversary from porting such
a ciphertext from a domain token associated to an honest trust
to a domain token that is under its control. We describe how we
formalized the proof of security for the encryption scheme used
in AWS KMS in Section 5, and how we showed that the security
model it satisfies is sufficient for the purposes of the DMP.
Trust management operations. Figure 5 shows the modeling of host
operations. This consists of checking a signed trust (token) for
consistency and its relation to its predecessor. The latter means
checking that the signer is in the predecessor trust, and that the
13
When this operator is used in unwrap we have old=trust. The same operator is used
for checking updates by both hosts and HSMs; in that case, the signer must be an HSM
of the predecessor trust as well.
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op tr_initial(trust : Trust) = tfpr trust = None.
op checkTrustProgress(old new : Trust) = old = tfpr new.
proc installUpdatedTrust(hstid : HstId, tk : Token) : bool = {
b← false;
if (hstid ∈ HstPolSrv.hosts_tr) {
old← hosts_tr[hstid];
(∗ Signer must be in old trust and trust must be installable ∗)
b← tk.tk_inst ∧ checkToken tk.tk_inst old tk.tk_trust tk.tk_wdata ∧
hstid ∈ hosts_tr ∧ ¬tr_initial (tr_data tk.tk_trust) ∧
checkTrustProgress hosts_tr[hstid] tk.tk_trust;




Figure 5: Host Trust Update Operation
op checkTrustUpdate(old : Trust, new : Trust, auth : Authorizations) : bool =
(∗ Check threshold n preserved ∗)
tthr old = tthr new ∧
(∗ Signers are a quorum ∗)
fdom auth \subset tops old ∧
(∗ Signers are a quorum of correct size ∗)
(tthr old) ≤ card (fdom auth) ∧
(∗ Check hash consistency ∗)
tfpr new = hash old ∧
(∗ Check all new members signed ∗)
let newmems = tmems new \ tmems old in
let newops = tops new \ tops old in
(∗ Verify all signatures ∗)
let msg = encode (newmems,newops) in
all (fun o⇒ o ∈ auth ∧ verify (o, msg, oget auth[o])) (fdom auth).
Figure 6: HSM Trust Update Validation
predecessor fingerprint contained in the new trust is the finger-
print of the predecessor trust (so the new trust can also not be an
initial/root trust, and must actually have a fingerprint). Note that,
for each host, we keep track of which trust is installed using a map
hosts_tr.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the behavior of an HSM when checking a
request for a trust update after successful unwrapping of the domain
token containing the old trust. This ensures that an HSM member
of the old trust has signed it. The update request is formalized by
providing the new trust and a set of authorizations, which are just
signatures by operators on the members of the new trust, who are
not in the old trust. The check enforces that the minimum quorum
size (tthr old) is preserved, and that a quorum of at least this size of
operators in the old trust have signed the request. This is computed
by a fold over the list of operators auth that signed the request.
4 REAL-VS-IDEAL SECURITY FOR KMS DMP
In this section we describe and justify the security definition we
adopted for the DMP, corresponding to the AEAD-service layer
as shown in Figure 1. We begin by defining a general syntax for
(possibly distributed) cryptographic keymanagement APIs, inspired
by the work of Shrimpton, Stam andWarinschi [23]. This formalism
abstracts away all the details of the protocol that are not directly
related to key operations, and we believe it to be of independent
interest to analyse the security of other key management APIs.
This allows us to reason about different security models using
simpler definitions, and later refine the results for the concrete
case of the DMP. With this refinement in mind, we clarify how
the introduced abstract notions map to DMP features in various
remarks throughout the text.
type KMS_Oracles = {
proc newOp(badOp : bool) : OpId option ∗ OpSk option
proc requestAuthorization(request : Request, opid : OpId)
: Authorization option
proc newHst() : HstId
proc installInitialTrust(hstid : HstId, tk : Token) : bool
proc installUpdatedTrust(hstid : HstId, tk : Token) : bool
proc newHSM() : HId
proc newToken(hid : HId, new : Trust) : Token option
proc updateTokenTrust(hid : HId, new_trust : Trust, auth : Authorizations,
tk : Token) : Token option
proc addTokenKey(hid : HId, hdl : Handle, tk : Token) : Token option · · · }.
Figure 7: KMS TkManage and TkNewKey Operations
4.1 Key Management APIs
Key management APIs store keys in tokens. In the real world, a
token can be implemented by using trusted hardware (e.g., an HSM
or a SIM card) to store and perform computations with the keys,
in which case keys may never leave the trusted boundaries of the
hardware device. In other settings, for example in the cases where
the underlying hardware cannot store the key material in its inter-
nal state, tokens are implemented as cryptographically hardened
data structures, which guarantee that only trusted devices can (tem-
porarily) access the key material. Our formalization abstracts these
details and applies to both cases.
A token tk is a data structure mapping handles (key identifiers)
to keys key, together with some meta-data that is used by the API
for management operations. The basic operations on tokens are:
• TkManage(tk, cmd): a generic interface that captures all man-
agement operations that can be carried out on tokens, including
creating a new empty token, changing meta-data, and all other
operations that do not affect the keys stored in the token.
14
On
input a token tk and a command description, it returns a (possibly
updated) token.
• TkNewKey(tk, hdl, cmd): samples a new key from the appro-
priate distribution and adds it to the token under the relation
hdl→ key and following the API-specific instructions described
in cmd. The success of this operation may depend on the consis-
tency of the input token itself and on the command cmd, e.g. the
command might violate a check on permissions for generating
keys in a particular token.
15
• TkReveal(tk, hdl, cmd): exposes the key associatedwith hdlwithin
tk, following the API-specific instructions described in cmd. As
before, the success of this operation may depend on the command
details cmd.
The TkReveal operation is a modeling artifact. It is used to make
explicit that any cryptographic API will contain as part of its in-
ternal mechanisms a procedure to recover keys contained within
tokens, so that they can be used to provide cryptographic services.
This serves two purposes: i. to define what correctness of an API
means, and ii. to obtain keys managed by the API in the security
games that define API security—in some cases these keys are simply
given to the adversary in order to model security breaches and, in
other cases, they are used to construct challenges for the adversary.
Relation to the DMP.We show in Figure 7 the EasyCrypt declarations
matching the notions of TkNewKey (addTokenKey) and TkManage (the
14
I.e., these commands may change the state of the API and even the meta-data
associated with keys, but the handle-to-key map will not change.
15
We do not model key deletion operations; including them in the model does not
affect the proof rationale, but it adds complexity to invariants.
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remaining proc declarations) for the DMP. addTokenKey simply takes
the identity of the HSM that shall carry out the operation of adding
a key to the token.
In token management (TkManage), we include procedures to
create new genuine operators (the model allows both honest and
dishonest ones, in which case the adversary gets the signing key)
and genuine hosts and HSMs. The requestAuthorization procedure models
the actions of honest operators signing attestation requests for
genuine entity identities, in which case this management operation
is really not operating on tokens, but only on the global state of the
API. The body of this procedure just checks that all entities in the
request are indeed genuine and signs the request with the key for
honest operator OpId.
Two procedures model the operations on hosts: installing an
initial trust in host hstid, and updating the installed trust. In the first
case, the body of the procedure ensures that the installed trust is
honest and initial. This captures the global assumption that we
are focusing our analysis on hosts that were initially configured
with honest trusts (there is nothing one can guarantee otherwise).
In the latter case, the procedure executes the operations for hosts
shown in Figure 5. Finally, the newToken and updateTokenTrust procedures
model the actions of HSMs when they are called upon to create
empty tokens, or to update a trust based on authorizations issued
by operators.
Crucially our model enforces that, as in the DMP, the states of
genuine HSMs, operators and hosts are totally disjoint, and that the
only communication between the different entities in the model
must be explicitly performed using calls to this API.
It remains to explain the semantics of the TkReveal operation
within AWS KMS. Recall that the purpose of the operation in the
syntax of key management APIs is to allow defining security exper-
iments that explicitly have access to API-protected keys in order
to express the goal of an adversary (e.g., to formalize that a key
is indistinguishable from random, the experiment needs to have
access to the key in order to construct a real-or-random oracle). In
our model of the DMP, TkReveal is simply the operation that asks




Correctness. A natural requirement for key management APIs is
that, subject to an API-specific set of restrictions over calls, they
reliably store secret keys. To define correctness we introduce a pred-
icate valid over traces of calls to TkManage and TkNewKey, which
for a given token-handle-command input (tk, hdl, cmd) indicates
whether a reveal operation should successfully return a key. In the
AWS KMS model, valid simply requires that the command is placed
on a genuine HSM, and the trust of the domain token is installed in
a genuine host. Correctness requires that, if the HSM validates the
domain token and a key with to hdl is stored within, then TkReveal
must successfully recover it.
4.2 Defining Security of Encryption Services
Cryptographic key management APIs such as the DMP are used to
build cryptographic services. In this section we follow the approach
adopted in Universal Composability to formalizing this notion, by
16 TkReveal is of course not an actual operation of the DMP; it is only used as part of
the proof.
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A
<latexit sha1_base64="OWgj5x0Xq+DfYa1o3lCzK+pIkDI=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFl147KCfUAbymQ6aYdOZsLMjVBCP8ONC0Xc+jXu/BsnbRbaemDgcM69zLknTAQ36HnfTmltfWNzq7xd2dnd2z+oHh61jUo1ZS2qhNLdkBgmuGQt5ChYN9GMxKFgnXByl/udJ6YNV/IRpwkLYjKSPOKUoJV6/ZjgmBKR3cwG1ZpX9+ZwV4lfkBoUaA6qX/2homnMJFJBjOn5XoJBRjRyKtis0k8NSwidkBHrWSpJzEyQzSPP3DOrDN1IafskunP190ZGYmOmcWgn84hm2cvF/7xeitF1kHGZpMgkXXwUpcJF5eb3u0OuGUUxtYRQzW1Wl46JJhRtSxVbgr988ippX9R9yx8ua43boo4ynMApnIMPV9CAe2hCCygoeIZXeHPQeXHenY/FaMkpdo7hD5zPH3BQkVc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OWgj5x0Xq+DfYa1o3lCzK+pIkDI=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFl147KCfUAbymQ6aYdOZsLMjVBCP8ONC0Xc+jXu/BsnbRbaemDgcM69zLknTAQ36HnfTmltfWNzq7xd2dnd2z+oHh61jUo1ZS2qhNLdkBgmuGQt5ChYN9GMxKFgnXByl/udJ6YNV/IRpwkLYjKSPOKUoJV6/ZjgmBKR3cwG1ZpX9+ZwV4lfkBoUaA6qX/2homnMJFJBjOn5XoJBRjRyKtis0k8NSwidkBHrWSpJzEyQzSPP3DOrDN1IafskunP190ZGYmOmcWgn84hm2cvF/7xeitF1kHGZpMgkXXwUpcJF5eb3u0OuGUUxtYRQzW1Wl46JJhRtSxVbgr988ippX9R9yx8ua43boo4ynMApnIMPV9CAe2hCCygoeIZXeHPQeXHenY/FaMkpdo7hD5zPH3BQkVc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OWgj5x0Xq+DfYa1o3lCzK+pIkDI=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFl147KCfUAbymQ6aYdOZsLMjVBCP8ONC0Xc+jXu/BsnbRbaemDgcM69zLknTAQ36HnfTmltfWNzq7xd2dnd2z+oHh61jUo1ZS2qhNLdkBgmuGQt5ChYN9GMxKFgnXByl/udJ6YNV/IRpwkLYjKSPOKUoJV6/ZjgmBKR3cwG1ZpX9+ZwV4lfkBoUaA6qX/2homnMJFJBjOn5XoJBRjRyKtis0k8NSwidkBHrWSpJzEyQzSPP3DOrDN1IafskunP190ZGYmOmcWgn84hm2cvF/7xeitF1kHGZpMgkXXwUpcJF5eb3u0OuGUUxtYRQzW1Wl46JJhRtSxVbgr988ippX9R9yx8ua43boo4ynMApnIMPV9CAe2hCCygoeIZXeHPQeXHenY/FaMkpdo7hD5zPH3BQkVc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OWgj5x0Xq+DfYa1o3lCzK+pIkDI=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFl147KCfUAbymQ6aYdOZsLMjVBCP8ONC0Xc+jXu/BsnbRbaemDgcM69zLknTAQ36HnfTmltfWNzq7xd2dnd2z+oHh61jUo1ZS2qhNLdkBgmuGQt5ChYN9GMxKFgnXByl/udJ6YNV/IRpwkLYjKSPOKUoJV6/ZjgmBKR3cwG1ZpX9+ZwV4lfkBoUaA6qX/2homnMJFJBjOn5XoJBRjRyKtis0k8NSwidkBHrWSpJzEyQzSPP3DOrDN1IafskunP190ZGYmOmcWgn84hm2cvF/7xeitF1kHGZpMgkXXwUpcJF5eb3u0OuGUUxtYRQzW1Wl46JJhRtSxVbgr988ippX9R9yx8ua43boo4ynMApnIMPV9CAe2hCCygoeIZXeHPQeXHenY/FaMkpdo7hD5zPH3BQkVc=</latexit>
TkManage(tk, cmd)
<latexit sha1_base64="kWECtCB+dNRNaFJwerx4IdZnSxA=">AAACFHicbZBNS8NAEIY39avWr6hHL4tFqCglEUGPRS9ehAr9gjaUzWbTLtlswu5GKCE/wot/xYsHRbx68Oa/cZumoNWBgYd3ZpiZ140ZlcqyvozS0vLK6lp5vbKxubW9Y+7udWSUCEzaOGKR6LlIEkY5aSuqGOnFgqDQZaTrBtfTeveeCEkj3lKTmDghGnHqU4yUlobmySBEaiz9tBXcIo5GJKvNFRVkp3PGoZcdD82qVbfygH/BLqAKimgOzc+BF+EkJFxhhqTs21asnBQJRTEjWWWQSBIjHOi1fY0chUQ6af5UBo+04kE/Ejq5grn6cyJFoZST0NWd+ZGLtan4X62fKP/SSSmPE0U4ni3yEwZVBKcOQY8KghWbaEBYUH0rxGMkEFbax4o2wV58+S90zuq25rvzauOqsKMMDsAhqAEbXIAGuAFN0AYYPIAn8AJejUfj2Xgz3metJaOY2Qe/wvj4Bhnan3Y=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kWECtCB+dNRNaFJwerx4IdZnSxA=">AAACFHicbZBNS8NAEIY39avWr6hHL4tFqCglEUGPRS9ehAr9gjaUzWbTLtlswu5GKCE/wot/xYsHRbx68Oa/cZumoNWBgYd3ZpiZ140ZlcqyvozS0vLK6lp5vbKxubW9Y+7udWSUCEzaOGKR6LlIEkY5aSuqGOnFgqDQZaTrBtfTeveeCEkj3lKTmDghGnHqU4yUlobmySBEaiz9tBXcIo5GJKvNFRVkp3PGoZcdD82qVbfygH/BLqAKimgOzc+BF+EkJFxhhqTs21asnBQJRTEjWWWQSBIjHOi1fY0chUQ6af5UBo+04kE/Ejq5grn6cyJFoZST0NWd+ZGLtan4X62fKP/SSSmPE0U4ni3yEwZVBKcOQY8KghWbaEBYUH0rxGMkEFbax4o2wV58+S90zuq25rvzauOqsKMMDsAhqAEbXIAGuAFN0AYYPIAn8AJejUfj2Xgz3metJaOY2Qe/wvj4Bhnan3Y=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kWECtCB+dNRNaFJwerx4IdZnSxA=">AAACFHicbZBNS8NAEIY39avWr6hHL4tFqCglEUGPRS9ehAr9gjaUzWbTLtlswu5GKCE/wot/xYsHRbx68Oa/cZumoNWBgYd3ZpiZ140ZlcqyvozS0vLK6lp5vbKxubW9Y+7udWSUCEzaOGKR6LlIEkY5aSuqGOnFgqDQZaTrBtfTeveeCEkj3lKTmDghGnHqU4yUlobmySBEaiz9tBXcIo5GJKvNFRVkp3PGoZcdD82qVbfygH/BLqAKimgOzc+BF+EkJFxhhqTs21asnBQJRTEjWWWQSBIjHOi1fY0chUQ6af5UBo+04kE/Ejq5grn6cyJFoZST0NWd+ZGLtan4X62fKP/SSSmPE0U4ni3yEwZVBKcOQY8KghWbaEBYUH0rxGMkEFbax4o2wV58+S90zuq25rvzauOqsKMMDsAhqAEbXIAGuAFN0AYYPIAn8AJejUfj2Xgz3metJaOY2Qe/wvj4Bhnan3Y=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="kWECtCB+dNRNaFJwerx4IdZnSxA=">AAACFHicbZBNS8NAEIY39avWr6hHL4tFqCglEUGPRS9ehAr9gjaUzWbTLtlswu5GKCE/wot/xYsHRbx68Oa/cZumoNWBgYd3ZpiZ140ZlcqyvozS0vLK6lp5vbKxubW9Y+7udWSUCEzaOGKR6LlIEkY5aSuqGOnFgqDQZaTrBtfTeveeCEkj3lKTmDghGnHqU4yUlobmySBEaiz9tBXcIo5GJKvNFRVkp3PGoZcdD82qVbfygH/BLqAKimgOzc+BF+EkJFxhhqTs21asnBQJRTEjWWWQSBIjHOi1fY0chUQ6af5UBo+04kE/Ejq5grn6cyJFoZST0NWd+ZGLtan4X62fKP/SSSmPE0U4ni3yEwZVBKcOQY8KghWbaEBYUH0rxGMkEFbax4o2wV58+S90zuq25rvzauOqsKMMDsAhqAEbXIAGuAFN0AYYPIAn8AJejUfj2Xgz3metJaOY2Qe/wvj4Bhnan3Y=</latexit>
New(hdl)
<latexit sha1_base64="igGoH5WRiUbZU7Je+AS11l2EH+c=">AAACA3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdaebwSLUTUlE0GXRjSupYB/QhjKZ3LRDJw9mJkoJATf+ihsXirj1J9z5N07TCNp6YODMOfdy7z1uzJlUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRomg0KQRj0THJRI4C6GpmOLQiQWQwOXQdkeXE799B0KyKLxV4xicgAxC5jNKlJb65n4vIGoo/fQa7rPqz2fo8ey4b1asmpUDzxO7IBVUoNE3P3teRJMAQkU5kbJrW7FyUiIUoxyyci+REBM6IgPoahqSAKST5jdk+EgrHvYjoV+ocK7+7khJIOU4cHVlvuSsNxH/87qJ8s+dlIVxoiCk00F+wrGK8CQQ7DEBVPGxJoQKpnfFdEgEoUrHVtYh2LMnz5PWSc3W/Oa0Ur8o4iihA3SIqshGZ6iOrlADNRFFD+gJvaBX49F4Nt6M92npglH07KE/MD6+AYVTmBA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="igGoH5WRiUbZU7Je+AS11l2EH+c=">AAACA3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdaebwSLUTUlE0GXRjSupYB/QhjKZ3LRDJw9mJkoJATf+ihsXirj1J9z5N07TCNp6YODMOfdy7z1uzJlUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRomg0KQRj0THJRI4C6GpmOLQiQWQwOXQdkeXE799B0KyKLxV4xicgAxC5jNKlJb65n4vIGoo/fQa7rPqz2fo8ey4b1asmpUDzxO7IBVUoNE3P3teRJMAQkU5kbJrW7FyUiIUoxyyci+REBM6IgPoahqSAKST5jdk+EgrHvYjoV+ocK7+7khJIOU4cHVlvuSsNxH/87qJ8s+dlIVxoiCk00F+wrGK8CQQ7DEBVPGxJoQKpnfFdEgEoUrHVtYh2LMnz5PWSc3W/Oa0Ur8o4iihA3SIqshGZ6iOrlADNRFFD+gJvaBX49F4Nt6M92npglH07KE/MD6+AYVTmBA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="igGoH5WRiUbZU7Je+AS11l2EH+c=">AAACA3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdaebwSLUTUlE0GXRjSupYB/QhjKZ3LRDJw9mJkoJATf+ihsXirj1J9z5N07TCNp6YODMOfdy7z1uzJlUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRomg0KQRj0THJRI4C6GpmOLQiQWQwOXQdkeXE799B0KyKLxV4xicgAxC5jNKlJb65n4vIGoo/fQa7rPqz2fo8ey4b1asmpUDzxO7IBVUoNE3P3teRJMAQkU5kbJrW7FyUiIUoxyyci+REBM6IgPoahqSAKST5jdk+EgrHvYjoV+ocK7+7khJIOU4cHVlvuSsNxH/87qJ8s+dlIVxoiCk00F+wrGK8CQQ7DEBVPGxJoQKpnfFdEgEoUrHVtYh2LMnz5PWSc3W/Oa0Ur8o4iihA3SIqshGZ6iOrlADNRFFD+gJvaBX49F4Nt6M92npglH07KE/MD6+AYVTmBA=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="igGoH5WRiUbZU7Je+AS11l2EH+c=">AAACA3icbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdaebwSLUTUlE0GXRjSupYB/QhjKZ3LRDJw9mJkoJATf+ihsXirj1J9z5N07TCNp6YODMOfdy7z1uzJlUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRomg0KQRj0THJRI4C6GpmOLQiQWQwOXQdkeXE799B0KyKLxV4xicgAxC5jNKlJb65n4vIGoo/fQa7rPqz2fo8ey4b1asmpUDzxO7IBVUoNE3P3teRJMAQkU5kbJrW7FyUiIUoxyyci+REBM6IgPoahqSAKST5jdk+EgrHvYjoV+ocK7+7khJIOU4cHVlvuSsNxH/87qJ8s+dlIVxoiCk00F+wrGK8CQQ7DEBVPGxJoQKpnfFdEgEoUrHVtYh2LMnz5PWSc3W/Oa0Ur8o4iihA3SIqshGZ6iOrlADNRFFD+gJvaBX49F4Nt6M92npglH07KE/MD6+AYVTmBA=</latexit>
F
<latexit sha1_base64="3YazphpYbOdSv13oW5JpP1zWBt4=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFkUxGUF+4A2lMl00g6dzISZG6GEfoYbF4q49Wvc+TdO2iy09cDA4Zx7mXNPmAhu0PO+ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqG5VqylpUCaW7ITFMcMlayFGwbqIZiUPBOuHkNvc7T0wbruQjThMWxGQkecQpQSv1+jHBMSUiu5sNqjWv7s3hrhK/IDUo0BxUv/pDRdOYSaSCGNPzvQSDjGjkVLBZpZ8alhA6ISPWs1SSmJkgm0eeuWdWGbqR0vZJdOfq742MxMZM49BO5hHNspeL/3m9FKPrIOMySZFJuvgoSoWLys3vd4dcM4piagmhmtusLh0TTSjaliq2BH/55FXSvqj7lj9c1ho3RR1lOIFTOAcfrqAB99CEFlBQ8Ayv8Oag8+K8Ox+L0ZJT7BzDHzifP3fpkVw=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3YazphpYbOdSv13oW5JpP1zWBt4=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFkUxGUF+4A2lMl00g6dzISZG6GEfoYbF4q49Wvc+TdO2iy09cDA4Zx7mXNPmAhu0PO+ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqG5VqylpUCaW7ITFMcMlayFGwbqIZiUPBOuHkNvc7T0wbruQjThMWxGQkecQpQSv1+jHBMSUiu5sNqjWv7s3hrhK/IDUo0BxUv/pDRdOYSaSCGNPzvQSDjGjkVLBZpZ8alhA6ISPWs1SSmJkgm0eeuWdWGbqR0vZJdOfq742MxMZM49BO5hHNspeL/3m9FKPrIOMySZFJuvgoSoWLys3vd4dcM4piagmhmtusLh0TTSjaliq2BH/55FXSvqj7lj9c1ho3RR1lOIFTOAcfrqAB99CEFlBQ8Ayv8Oag8+K8Ox+L0ZJT7BzDHzifP3fpkVw=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3YazphpYbOdSv13oW5JpP1zWBt4=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFkUxGUF+4A2lMl00g6dzISZG6GEfoYbF4q49Wvc+TdO2iy09cDA4Zx7mXNPmAhu0PO+ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqG5VqylpUCaW7ITFMcMlayFGwbqIZiUPBOuHkNvc7T0wbruQjThMWxGQkecQpQSv1+jHBMSUiu5sNqjWv7s3hrhK/IDUo0BxUv/pDRdOYSaSCGNPzvQSDjGjkVLBZpZ8alhA6ISPWs1SSmJkgm0eeuWdWGbqR0vZJdOfq742MxMZM49BO5hHNspeL/3m9FKPrIOMySZFJuvgoSoWLys3vd4dcM4piagmhmtusLh0TTSjaliq2BH/55FXSvqj7lj9c1ho3RR1lOIFTOAcfrqAB99CEFlBQ8Ayv8Oag8+K8Ox+L0ZJT7BzDHzifP3fpkVw=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3YazphpYbOdSv13oW5JpP1zWBt4=">AAAB8nicbVDLSsNAFL2pr1pfVZdugkVwVRIRdFkUxGUF+4A2lMl00g6dzISZG6GEfoYbF4q49Wvc+TdO2iy09cDA4Zx7mXNPmAhu0PO+ndLa+sbmVnm7srO7t39QPTxqG5VqylpUCaW7ITFMcMlayFGwbqIZiUPBOuHkNvc7T0wbruQjThMWxGQkecQpQSv1+jHBMSUiu5sNqjWv7s3hrhK/IDUo0BxUv/pDRdOYSaSCGNPzvQSDjGjkVLBZpZ8alhA6ISPWs1SSmJkgm0eeuWdWGbqR0vZJdOfq742MxMZM49BO5hHNspeL/3m9FKPrIOMySZFJuvgoSoWLys3vd4dcM4piagmhmtusLh0TTSjaliq2BH/55FXSvqj7lj9c1ho3RR1lOIFTOAcfrqAB99CEFlBQ8Ayv8Oag8+K8Ox+L0ZJT7BzDHzifP3fpkVw=</latexit>
TkNewKey(tk, hdl, cmd)
<latexit sha1_base64="LetTy/f0bA0tV25s+QGuPLhA2ks=">AAACIXicbZBLS8NAEMc39VXrK+rRS7AIFaQkIthj0YsgSIW+oC1ls5m0SzcPdjdKCPkqXvwqXjwo0pv4ZdymLWrrwMJv/zPDzPztkFEhTfNTy62srq1v5DcLW9s7u3v6/kFTBBEn0CABC3jbxgIY9aEhqWTQDjlgz2bQskfXk3zrAbiggV+XcQg9Dw986lKCpZL6eqXrYTkUblIf3cHjLcRpaa7IUXo256HDfj7Ec9LTvl40y2YWxjJYMyiiWdT6+rjrBCTywJeEYSE6lhnKXoK5pIRBWuhGAkJMRngAHYU+9kD0kuzC1DhRimO4AVfPl0am/u5IsCdE7NmqMltyMTcR/8t1IulWegn1w0iCT6aD3IgZMjAmdhkO5UAkixVgwqna1SBDzDGRytSCMsFaPHkZmudlS/H9RbF6NbMjj47QMSohC12iKrpBNdRABD2hF/SG3rVn7VX70MbT0pw26zlEf0L7+gb9n6U9</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="LetTy/f0bA0tV25s+QGuPLhA2ks=">AAACIXicbZBLS8NAEMc39VXrK+rRS7AIFaQkIthj0YsgSIW+oC1ls5m0SzcPdjdKCPkqXvwqXjwo0pv4ZdymLWrrwMJv/zPDzPztkFEhTfNTy62srq1v5DcLW9s7u3v6/kFTBBEn0CABC3jbxgIY9aEhqWTQDjlgz2bQskfXk3zrAbiggV+XcQg9Dw986lKCpZL6eqXrYTkUblIf3cHjLcRpaa7IUXo256HDfj7Ec9LTvl40y2YWxjJYMyiiWdT6+rjrBCTywJeEYSE6lhnKXoK5pIRBWuhGAkJMRngAHYU+9kD0kuzC1DhRimO4AVfPl0am/u5IsCdE7NmqMltyMTcR/8t1IulWegn1w0iCT6aD3IgZMjAmdhkO5UAkixVgwqna1SBDzDGRytSCMsFaPHkZmudlS/H9RbF6NbMjj47QMSohC12iKrpBNdRABD2hF/SG3rVn7VX70MbT0pw26zlEf0L7+gb9n6U9</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="LetTy/f0bA0tV25s+QGuPLhA2ks=">AAACIXicbZBLS8NAEMc39VXrK+rRS7AIFaQkIthj0YsgSIW+oC1ls5m0SzcPdjdKCPkqXvwqXjwo0pv4ZdymLWrrwMJv/zPDzPztkFEhTfNTy62srq1v5DcLW9s7u3v6/kFTBBEn0CABC3jbxgIY9aEhqWTQDjlgz2bQskfXk3zrAbiggV+XcQg9Dw986lKCpZL6eqXrYTkUblIf3cHjLcRpaa7IUXo256HDfj7Ec9LTvl40y2YWxjJYMyiiWdT6+rjrBCTywJeEYSE6lhnKXoK5pIRBWuhGAkJMRngAHYU+9kD0kuzC1DhRimO4AVfPl0am/u5IsCdE7NmqMltyMTcR/8t1IulWegn1w0iCT6aD3IgZMjAmdhkO5UAkixVgwqna1SBDzDGRytSCMsFaPHkZmudlS/H9RbF6NbMjj47QMSohC12iKrpBNdRABD2hF/SG3rVn7VX70MbT0pw26zlEf0L7+gb9n6U9</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="LetTy/f0bA0tV25s+QGuPLhA2ks=">AAACIXicbZBLS8NAEMc39VXrK+rRS7AIFaQkIthj0YsgSIW+oC1ls5m0SzcPdjdKCPkqXvwqXjwo0pv4ZdymLWrrwMJv/zPDzPztkFEhTfNTy62srq1v5DcLW9s7u3v6/kFTBBEn0CABC3jbxgIY9aEhqWTQDjlgz2bQskfXk3zrAbiggV+XcQg9Dw986lKCpZL6eqXrYTkUblIf3cHjLcRpaa7IUXo256HDfj7Ec9LTvl40y2YWxjJYMyiiWdT6+rjrBCTywJeEYSE6lhnKXoK5pIRBWuhGAkJMRngAHYU+9kD0kuzC1DhRimO4AVfPl0am/u5IsCdE7NmqMltyMTcR/8t1IulWegn1w0iCT6aD3IgZMjAmdhkO5UAkixVgwqna1SBDzDGRytSCMsFaPHkZmudlS/H9RbF6NbMjj47QMSohC12iKrpBNdRABD2hF/SG3rVn7VX70MbT0pw26zlEf0L7+gb9n6U9</latexit>
CorruptR(tk, hdl, cmd)




<latexit sha1_base64="3ceNf6Elz7DuFgZpW5xNtySS4io=">AAACHHicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUZdugkWoIGVGBV0WRXBZwT6gLSWTybShSWZIMkIZ5kPc+CtuXCjixoXg35iOU9TWA4Fzzr2X3Hu8iFGlHefTKiwsLi2vFFdLa+sbm1v29k5ThbHEpIFDFsq2hxRhVJCGppqRdiQJ4h4jLW90Oam37ohUNBS3ehyRHkcDQQOKkTZW3z7pcqSHKkiuBE4rUzH0WXo0FVwNfgTy08O+XXaqTgY4T9yclEGOet9+7/ohjjkRGjOkVMd1It1LkNQUM5KWurEiEcIjNCAdQwXiRPWS7LgUHhjHh0EozRMaZu7viQRxpcbcM53ZjrO1iflfrRPr4LyXUBHFmpjjs4+CmEEdwklS0KeSYM3GhiAsqdkV4iGSCGuTZ8mE4M6ePE+ax1XXqbo3p+XaRR5HEeyBfVABLjgDNXAN6qABMLgHj+AZvFgP1pP1ar19txasfGYX/IH18QXLjaMI</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3ceNf6Elz7DuFgZpW5xNtySS4io=">AAACHHicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUZdugkWoIGVGBV0WRXBZwT6gLSWTybShSWZIMkIZ5kPc+CtuXCjixoXg35iOU9TWA4Fzzr2X3Hu8iFGlHefTKiwsLi2vFFdLa+sbm1v29k5ThbHEpIFDFsq2hxRhVJCGppqRdiQJ4h4jLW90Oam37ohUNBS3ehyRHkcDQQOKkTZW3z7pcqSHKkiuBE4rUzH0WXo0FVwNfgTy08O+XXaqTgY4T9yclEGOet9+7/ohjjkRGjOkVMd1It1LkNQUM5KWurEiEcIjNCAdQwXiRPWS7LgUHhjHh0EozRMaZu7viQRxpcbcM53ZjrO1iflfrRPr4LyXUBHFmpjjs4+CmEEdwklS0KeSYM3GhiAsqdkV4iGSCGuTZ8mE4M6ePE+ax1XXqbo3p+XaRR5HEeyBfVABLjgDNXAN6qABMLgHj+AZvFgP1pP1ar19txasfGYX/IH18QXLjaMI</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3ceNf6Elz7DuFgZpW5xNtySS4io=">AAACHHicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUZdugkWoIGVGBV0WRXBZwT6gLSWTybShSWZIMkIZ5kPc+CtuXCjixoXg35iOU9TWA4Fzzr2X3Hu8iFGlHefTKiwsLi2vFFdLa+sbm1v29k5ThbHEpIFDFsq2hxRhVJCGppqRdiQJ4h4jLW90Oam37ohUNBS3ehyRHkcDQQOKkTZW3z7pcqSHKkiuBE4rUzH0WXo0FVwNfgTy08O+XXaqTgY4T9yclEGOet9+7/ohjjkRGjOkVMd1It1LkNQUM5KWurEiEcIjNCAdQwXiRPWS7LgUHhjHh0EozRMaZu7viQRxpcbcM53ZjrO1iflfrRPr4LyXUBHFmpjjs4+CmEEdwklS0KeSYM3GhiAsqdkV4iGSCGuTZ8mE4M6ePE+ax1XXqbo3p+XaRR5HEeyBfVABLjgDNXAN6qABMLgHj+AZvFgP1pP1ar19txasfGYX/IH18QXLjaMI</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="3ceNf6Elz7DuFgZpW5xNtySS4io=">AAACHHicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUZdugkWoIGVGBV0WRXBZwT6gLSWTybShSWZIMkIZ5kPc+CtuXCjixoXg35iOU9TWA4Fzzr2X3Hu8iFGlHefTKiwsLi2vFFdLa+sbm1v29k5ThbHEpIFDFsq2hxRhVJCGppqRdiQJ4h4jLW90Oam37ohUNBS3ehyRHkcDQQOKkTZW3z7pcqSHKkiuBE4rUzH0WXo0FVwNfgTy08O+XXaqTgY4T9yclEGOet9+7/ohjjkRGjOkVMd1It1LkNQUM5KWurEiEcIjNCAdQwXiRPWS7LgUHhjHh0EozRMaZu7viQRxpcbcM53ZjrO1iflfrRPr4LyXUBHFmpjjs4+CmEEdwklS0KeSYM3GhiAsqdkV4iGSCGuTZ8mE4M6ePE+ax1XXqbo3p+XaRR5HEeyBfVABLjgDNXAN6qABMLgHj+AZvFgP1pP1ar19txasfGYX/IH18QXLjaMI</latexit>
Dec(hdl, cph, ad)
<latexit sha1_base64="zaqRwFurlO3dDhI6trC/dBuKiZY=">AAACHHicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsAgVpCQq6LKoC5cV7APaUCaTSTN0MgkzE6GEfIgbf8WNC0XcuBD8G6dpitp6YOCcc+9l7j1uzKhUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRonApIkjFomOiyRhlJOmooqRTiwICl1G2u7walxv3xMhacTv1CgmTogGnPoUI6WtvnnaC5EKpJ9eE5xVpyLwWHY8FTgOfgTysqO+WbFqVg44T+yCVECBRt/86HkRTkLCFWZIyq5txcpJkVAUM5KVe4kkMcJDNCBdTTkKiXTS/LgMHmrHg34k9OMK5u7viRSFUo5CV3fmO87WxuZ/tW6i/AsnpTxOFOF48pGfMKgiOE4KelQQrNhIE4QF1btCHCCBsNJ5lnUI9uzJ86R1UrOtmn17VqlfFnGUwD44AFVgg3NQBzegAZoAgwfwBF7Aq/FoPBtvxvukdcEoZvbAHxif36fbovI=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="zaqRwFurlO3dDhI6trC/dBuKiZY=">AAACHHicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsAgVpCQq6LKoC5cV7APaUCaTSTN0MgkzE6GEfIgbf8WNC0XcuBD8G6dpitp6YOCcc+9l7j1uzKhUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRonApIkjFomOiyRhlJOmooqRTiwICl1G2u7walxv3xMhacTv1CgmTogGnPoUI6WtvnnaC5EKpJ9eE5xVpyLwWHY8FTgOfgTysqO+WbFqVg44T+yCVECBRt/86HkRTkLCFWZIyq5txcpJkVAUM5KVe4kkMcJDNCBdTTkKiXTS/LgMHmrHg34k9OMK5u7viRSFUo5CV3fmO87WxuZ/tW6i/AsnpTxOFOF48pGfMKgiOE4KelQQrNhIE4QF1btCHCCBsNJ5lnUI9uzJ86R1UrOtmn17VqlfFnGUwD44AFVgg3NQBzegAZoAgwfwBF7Aq/FoPBtvxvukdcEoZvbAHxif36fbovI=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="zaqRwFurlO3dDhI6trC/dBuKiZY=">AAACHHicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsAgVpCQq6LKoC5cV7APaUCaTSTN0MgkzE6GEfIgbf8WNC0XcuBD8G6dpitp6YOCcc+9l7j1uzKhUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRonApIkjFomOiyRhlJOmooqRTiwICl1G2u7walxv3xMhacTv1CgmTogGnPoUI6WtvnnaC5EKpJ9eE5xVpyLwWHY8FTgOfgTysqO+WbFqVg44T+yCVECBRt/86HkRTkLCFWZIyq5txcpJkVAUM5KVe4kkMcJDNCBdTTkKiXTS/LgMHmrHg34k9OMK5u7viRSFUo5CV3fmO87WxuZ/tW6i/AsnpTxOFOF48pGfMKgiOE4KelQQrNhIE4QF1btCHCCBsNJ5lnUI9uzJ86R1UrOtmn17VqlfFnGUwD44AFVgg3NQBzegAZoAgwfwBF7Aq/FoPBtvxvukdcEoZvbAHxif36fbovI=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="zaqRwFurlO3dDhI6trC/dBuKiZY=">AAACHHicbVDLSsNAFJ34rPUVdelmsAgVpCQq6LKoC5cV7APaUCaTSTN0MgkzE6GEfIgbf8WNC0XcuBD8G6dpitp6YOCcc+9l7j1uzKhUlvVlLCwuLa+sltbK6xubW9vmzm5LRonApIkjFomOiyRhlJOmooqRTiwICl1G2u7walxv3xMhacTv1CgmTogGnPoUI6WtvnnaC5EKpJ9eE5xVpyLwWHY8FTgOfgTysqO+WbFqVg44T+yCVECBRt/86HkRTkLCFWZIyq5txcpJkVAUM5KVe4kkMcJDNCBdTTkKiXTS/LgMHmrHg34k9OMK5u7viRSFUo5CV3fmO87WxuZ/tW6i/AsnpTxOFOF48pGfMKgiOE4KelQQrNhIE4QF1btCHCCBsNJ5lnUI9uzJ86R1UrOtmn17VqlfFnGUwD44AFVgg3NQBzegAZoAgwfwBF7Aq/FoPBtvxvukdcEoZvbAHxif36fbovI=</latexit>
Figure 8: Diagram of the UC-style ideal functionality.
focusing on a service that provides authenticated encryption on
client-chosen payloads, as described in Section 2.
The central component in our definition of correctness and se-
curity for such cryptographic service is an ideal functionality that
describes how the service is expected to behave if it were provided
as a monolithic self-contained block by a trusted-third-party. The
ideal functionality provides both a functional specification of the
service and a precise bound on the flow of information from the ser-
vice to the (possibly adversarial) environment. We will define this
functionality for the encryption service interface presented in Sec-
tion 3.1, but the approach extends naturally to other cryptographic
mechanisms providing confidentiality and authentication.
Our ideal functionality has two interfaces: the external interface
accessible to an arbitrary environment 𝒵 , and an adversarial inter-
face that captures whatever influence a malicious insider adversary
𝒜 is allowed with the underlying cryptographic API. The inter-
face accessible to 𝒜 is the same in the real and ideal worlds. We
show this pictorially in Figure 8. As expected, we let the adversary
𝒜 and the environment 𝒵 communicate freely. The execution is
controlled by 𝒵 , which may choose to interact with the outward
facing encryption service interface or pass control to 𝒜. In other
words, the goal of 𝒵 is to distinguish the real world encryption
service from an ideal authenticated encryption functionality. 𝒜 is
an insider colluding with the environment𝒵 , and helping it achieve
this goal.
Our ideal AEAD functionality follows the standard UC approach:
for each key hdl, calls to Enc(hdl,msg, ad) return encryptions of
a fixed constant, rather than msg; and Dec(hdl, cph, ad) returns
the original msg if and only if cph was previously given to 𝒵
as the result of a call to Enc(hdl,msg, ad). However, we need to
consider the underlying distributed protocol that manages access
to encryption keys, and the possibility that the adversary disrupts
its operation, e.g., by not allowing the API to complete a request.
Therefore, before answering requests placed by environment 𝒵 ,
we let adversary 𝒜 interact with the cryptographic API and lead it
into a configuration of its choice.
We now describe in more detail the real-world and ideal-world
experiments of our security model. The functionality keeps track
of a list of corrupted key handles and a list of key handles that
have been used in encryption and decryption.
17
In what follows,
ℰ and 𝒟 represent the encryption and decryption operations of a
standard AEAD scheme.
17
These lists will always be disjoint, as we do not allow corrupted keys to be used for
encryption operations. Fully removing this restriction would lead to a non-committing
encryption level of security, not a goal for AWS KMS. However, in Appendix B we
describe how our proof extends to a simple relaxation where corrupt keys can be used
after corruption.
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Real World. In the real world, the interface offered to environment
𝒵 behaves as follows:
• New(hdl) passes control to 𝒜, indicating that 𝒵 requested the
generation of a new domain key under handle hdl.
• Enc(hdl,msg, ad) passes control to𝒜, indicating that𝒵 requested
the AEAD encryption of payload msg with associated data ad,
under the secret key corresponding to handle hdl. Adversary 𝒜
is expected to eventually return a tuple (tk, cmd) and, if pred-
icate valid(trace, tk, hdl, cmd) holds and the key with hdl has
not been corrupted by 𝒜, the functionality computes sk ←
TkReveal(tk, hdl, cmd) and cph← ℰ (sk,msg, ad), returning the
result to 𝒵 . Otherwise, an error symbol is returned.
• Dec(hdl, cph, ad) passes control to𝒜, indicating that𝒵 requested
the decryption of ciphertext cph with associated data ad, under
the key corresponding to handle hdl. Adversary𝒜 is expected to
eventually return a tuple (tk, cmd) and, if valid(trace, tk, hdl, cmd)
holds and the key with hdl has not been corrupted by 𝒜, the
functionality computes sk← TkReveal(tk, hdl, cmd) andmsg←
𝒟(sk, cph, ad), returning the result to 𝒵 . Otherwise, an error
symbol is returned.
Note that, as in the previous section, our definition of security keeps
track of calls placed by𝒜 to the TkManage and TkNewKey oracles
and relies on the valid predicate to determine whether the service
is required to produce a correct output to the environment 𝒵 . Ad-
versary𝒜 may therefore prevent the service from answering client
requests by simply not executing the required API calls. Indeed,
valid will naturally exclude sequences of API calls where a secret
key with handle hdl is used before it is created, either because 𝒵
did not request its creation, or because 𝒜 decided against carrying
out this request. However, and crucially for our result, the valid
predicate is totally oblivious of the honesty of trusts and tokens,
so that any adversary that succeeds in leading the system into a
dishonest configuration is not restricted in its actions: as shown
below, it requires only that the selected host and HSM exist, and
that the host is configured with the trust in the selected token.
op valid (t : Trace, tk : Token, hdl : Hdl, c : Cmd) : bool =
(∗ · · · ∗)
with c = Creveal hstid hid⇒
let (hstmap,hids,tklist) = t
in ((hid ∈ hids) && (hstmap[hstid] = Some tk.tk_trust)).
Ideal World. In the ideal world, the interface offered to environment
𝒵 behaves identically to what we presented for the real world, with
the following exceptions. The ideal functionality keeps a tableT as-
sociating handle-ciphertext-authenticated data tuples (hdl, cph, ad)
to payload (msg) values, which is initially empty. When 𝒵 places
a call to one of its oracles, the following occurs:
• There is no change in oracle New(hdl).
• Enc(hdl,msg, ad) passes control to𝒜, indicating that𝒵 requested
the AEAD encryption of payload msg with associated data ad,
under the secret key corresponding to handle hdl. Adversary 𝒜
is expected to eventually return a tuple (tk, cmd) and, if pred-
icate valid(trace, tk, hdl, cmd) holds and the key with hdl has
not been corrupted by 𝒜, the functionality first computes sk←
TkReveal(tk, hdl, cmd) and cph ← ℰ (sk, 0 |msg | , ad). It then up-
dates the table with (hdl, cph, ad) → msg and returns cph to 𝒵 .
Otherwise, an error symbol is returned.
• Dec(hdl, cph, ad) passes control to𝒜, indicating that𝒵 requested
the decryption of ciphertext cph with associated data ad, under
the key corresponding to handle hdl. Adversary𝒜 is expected to
eventually return a tuple (tk, cmd) and, if valid(trace, tk, hdl, cmd)
holds and the key with hdl has not been corrupted by 𝒜, then
𝒵 receives T [(hdl, cph, ad)]. Otherwise, an error symbol is re-
turned.
This ends the presentation of the interface offered to 𝒵 .
Adversarial interface. The oracles available to𝒜 reflect precisely the
capabilities of a malicious insider adversary with direct access to the
cryptographic API. As a worst case scenario, we let this adversary
control the scheduling of API management and key generation
operations, which in particular means that such an adversary may
decide not to allow the API to answer the environment’s requests.
We follow common practice in cryptographic API security defini-
tions and allow𝒜 to corrupt keys using a CorruptR oracle, through
which it can explicitly learn any secret key with handle hdl, even
if such a key would otherwise be hidden from its view, i.e. even if
such a key is meant to be protected by the API. Importantly, this
captures a common real-world issue where keys are (maliciously
or inadvertently) leaked, and ensures that non-leaked keys remain
secret under those circumstances. To prevent the adversary from
trivially distinguishing the real world from the ideal world, we
never allow 𝒜 to corrupt a key that is used by the environment 𝒵
for encryption/decryption operations.
Security goal. We say a cryptographic service is secure if, for all
(𝒵,𝒜), the views of 𝒵 in the real and ideal worlds are computa-
tionally indistinguishable. This means that the real-world system is
not allowed to leak more than the ideal-world functionality, which
reveals nothing about client payloads to insider adversaries inter-
acting with the API.
5 MACHINE-CHECKED SECURITY PROOF
We describe the machine-checked proof in EasyCrypt in three steps,
corresponding to the three layers introduced in Section 2. We first
describe the formalization of indistinguishability-based security,
and show that this can be used as a convenient stepping stone in
the analysis of the DMP, as it implies our real-vs-ideal world notion
of security. This corresponds to the top layer in Figure 1. Then,
we describe a set of low-level abstractions that we constructed in
order to tame the complexity of the proof of indistinguishability-
based security. We also discuss how we proved that the security
guarantees that we modularly obtain from these abstractions follow
from standard cryptographic assumptions, which allows us to state
our main result in concrete terms. This corresponds to the lower-
level layer in Figure 1. Finally we describe the core theorem that
establishes the indistinguishability-based security of the DMP, and
highlight the most interesting technical aspects of its proof. This
corresponds to the intermediate layer shown in Figure 1.
5.1 From key hiding to real-vs-ideal security
The indistinguishability-based security of a cryptographic API [23]
guarantees that cryptographic keys managed by the API remain
hidden from the adversary. We adapt this notion to our formalism
via a game where, in addition to interacting with the API to create
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b′ ← 𝒜𝒪 (1λ );
return b = b′;
CorruptR(tk, hdl, cmd) :
key←⊥;
if hdl < Tested∧
valid(tk, hdl, cmd)
key← TkReveal(tk, hdl, cmd);
Corrupted← hdl : Corrupted;
return key;
Test(tk, hdl, cmd) :
key
1
← 𝒦(1λ ); key0 ←⊥;




← TkReveal(tk, hdl, cmd);









InsideR(tk, hdl, cmd) :
key←⊥;
if ¬(honest(tk, hdl, cmd))
key← TkReveal(tk, hdl, cmd);
return key;
𝒪 = {TkManage, TkNewKey, Test, InsideR, CorruptR}
Figure 9: Indistinguishability-based security.
and manage tokens, the adversary gets access to three oracles that
capture the key hiding property. The Test oracle internally uses
the TkReveal operator in order to model a real-or-random style
challenge oracle on keys. The CorruptR and InsideR oracles use
TkReveal to model explicit leakage of secret keys via corruption
and execution traces recognized as dishonest by the security def-
inition (note that such queries only strengthen the definition, as
they state that domain keys will be protected even if one specific
key is leaked by some external means). In particular, the CorruptR
oracle allows the adversary to expose keys that it might otherwise
be challenged on, and the InsideR oracle permits capturing CCA-
style attacks. The game is shown in Figure 9. In this experiment,
the adversary interacts with a set of oracles, which it can use to
test valid, non-corrupt handles, receiving either the real key or a
randomly generated one (depending on bit b). We require that no
adversary can win this game other than with small probability over
the random guess.
The following theorem, formalized and proved in EasyCrypt, im-
plies that any cryptographic API that satisfies indistinguishability-
based security will give rise to an encryption service that achieves
our notion of UC-style security, when used together with an AEAD
scheme satisfying the standard notions of correctness and security.
Theorem 5.1 (Informal). If a cryptographic API satisfies indis-
tinguishability-based security, and (ℰ ,𝒟) satisfy the standard no-
tions of AEAD security then, for all adversaries (𝒵,𝒜) the views
of 𝒵 in the real world and ideal worlds are indistinguishable.
The proof proceeds as follows. One first uses the indistinguisha-
bility-based security of the API to show that Dec is effectively
operating on a consistent secret key for each hdl, which are all
hidden from the adversary. Note that consistency is implied by
the indistinguishability definition, as the random branch b = 1
enforces that the same key is always returned for the same handle.
Consistency is essential to ensure that standard AEAD security
suffices in the next step of the proof, as otherwise one would need
robust-encryption-level guarantees to ensure that operations with
different keys on the same ciphertext do not leak information or
allow forgeries.
The second step is to use AEAD correctness and unforgeability to
switch to the table-like computation of Dec performed by the ideal
functionality. Note that, when reducing to the security of the API,
the validity predicate on traces enforced by the ideal functionality
directly matches identical conditions in the oracles available in
the indistinguishability-based definition. In particular, the corrupt
oracles exactly match.
In EasyCrypt, the theorem is stated as follows. Notice that the
reduction is tight, even though the bound includes the advantage of
correctness and indistinguishability-security twice. This is because
the proof requires symmetric game hops that first replace API
managed keys with random ones using the IND-property and, after
using AEAD security, restore the correct keys in order to match
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In the above statement, B, B1 and C are constructed adversaries.
This theorem allows us to focus on the main result proven in Easy-
Crypt in the rest of this section, namely that the KMS Domain
Management API satisfies indistinguishability-based security.
5.2 Low-level abstractions
We now describe the lower layer in the EasyCrypt development,
which defines and instantiates three reusable abstractions that are
then used as black-box modules in the proof of indistinguishability-
based security. The first abstraction is a generic signature service,
which we use multiple times in the proof and can be reused in future
EasyCrypt developments. The second abstraction is specific to AWS
KMS, and it was created for managing the complexity of the proof
by black-boxing the guarantees provided by the combined actions
of HSMs and human operators in domain management. The third
abstraction is the multi-recipient public-key encryption scheme,
which is only used once in the main proof of security, but is meant
for reuse in future EasyCrypt developments.
The ideal signature service abstraction. A central component in our
modeling of the protocol and its proof of security (in both ver-
sions) is the signature service abstraction. We introduce a module
called RealSignatureServ with an external interface that permits creating
stateless signers, each with an independent signing key.
This service offers a signature verification procedure that works
as a pure operator based on the public key and uses the signature
verification algorithm for the underlying signature scheme. This
means that any protocol using a digital signature with multiple
signers and arbitrary verifiers that have access to the public keys
can be described as a client to the real signature service. We then
show that the standard property of unforgeability implies that this
service is indistinguishable from an ideal one in which signature
verification is now carried out by checking a list of signed messages.
The proof of security of the protocol relies on two instances of
this abstraction, one for operator signatures and another one for
HSM signatures. When using this abstraction, one first rewrites the
description of the protocol as a function of the RealSignatureServ, which
is always possible. Then we can use the fact that no adversary
Session 1C: Cloud Security I CCS ’19, November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom
72
can distinguish this service from its ideal counterpart to modify
the protocol into another one that uses a table-based idealized
representation for signatures. From that point on, we can write
invariants that refer to these idealized tables, which contain domain
tokens/trusts (resp. identity attestations) if and only if they have
been signed by genuine HSMs (resp. operators).
Domain Management Abstraction.We define a general notion of a
domain management policy, for which we specify security in terms
of distinguishing a real policy enforcement mechanism from an
ideal policy enforcement mechanism.
Figure 10 details the module which captures the notion of a
domain management policy based on the actions of hosts, operators
and HSMs we have introduced in Section 3. This module maintains
two data structures that keep track of the trusts manipulated by
the system: protectedTrusts and parentTrust. Protected trusts are those that
contain only genuine parties; this can happen because the trust is
directly checked by operators in the isGoodInitialTrust operation to be a
good initial trust, or because an HSM has checked that it is a valid
descendant of a protected trust in checkTrustUpdate. The descendant
relation is maintained using the parentTrust map.
The idealized version of the abstraction, which we omit for
brevity, offers the same functionality as the real one, but ensures
the following invariants:
i. All protected trusts contain only genuine HSM members and
they descend from a protected trust.
ii. The descendant relation computed by HSMs behaves like an in-
jective function—any trust has at most one valid parent through-
out the lifetime of the system. This relation can be checked by
hosts, if it has been computed by HSMs.
Intuitively this proof follows in the lines of the invariant described
in Section 3. Note that this abstraction does not require genuine
hosts or HSMs to be able to tell whether a trust was previously
checked by a genuine HSM: it only speaks about trusts that have
been tagged as protected. More precisely, the ideal policy says
that, if a trust was previously tagged as protected, then the honest
property is propagated and a genuine host will have the same view
of the descendant relation; otherwise no guarantee is given.
In the main proof, which we discuss in the next subsection, we
strengthen the security guarantee provided by this abstraction,
relying on the authentication guarantees inherent to the signed
trust data structure: looking ahead, we will use the fact that any
trust for which the honesty property has been established must
have been signed by a genuine HSM.
The following EasyCrypt theorem provides a concrete bound for
any adversary distinguishing the real policy management module
from its idealized version for the KMS Domain Management policy
enforced by operators andHSMs. The bound is given by the collision
resistance property of the hash function used to compute trust
fingerprints, and the unforgeability advantage against the signature
scheme used by operators to certify identity keys, scaled up by the
maximum number of operators in the system q_ops.18
18
We note that our formalization relies on a unkeyed hash function. As we give
concrete security reductions, our results are meaningful for unkeyed cryptographic
hash functions used in practice, as discussed for example in [20]. Modifying the proof
to support a keyed hash function would be straightforward, but would require the
assumption that every entity in the system can be set-up with the same key.
module RealTrustService(OA : OperatorActions) : TrustService = {
var protectedTrusts : Trust fset
var parentTrust : (Trust,Trust) fmap
proc newOp = OpPolSrv(OA).newOp
proc addHId = OpPolSrv(OA).addHId
proc requestAuthorization = OpPolSrv(OA).requestAuthorization
proc newHst = HstPolSrv.newHst
proc installInitialTrust = HstPolSrv.installInitialTrust
proc installUpdatedTrust = HstPolSrv.installUpdatedTrust
proc isInstalledTrust = HstPolSrv.isInstalledTrust
proc isGoodInitialTrust(trust: Trust) = {
b← OpPolSrv(OA).isGoodInitialTrust(tr_data trust);
if (b) protectedTrusts← protectedTrusts | fset1 trust;
return b; }
proc checkTrustUpdate(old:Trust, new:Trust, auth:Authorizations) : bool = {
c← HSMPolSrv.checkTrustUpdate(old,new,auth);
protected← old ∈ protectedTrusts;
if (c) {
if (¬new ∈ parentTrust) parentTrust[new]← old;
if (protected) protectedTrusts← protectedTrusts | fset1 new;
}
return c; }
proc isProtectedTrust(trust : Trust) : bool = {
return trust ∈ protectedTrusts; }
· · ·
}.




Pr[CR(AdvCR(A)).main():res] + q_ops ∗ Pr[UF1(AdvUF1(A)).main():res].
where OAR=OA(RealSigServ)
Multi-recipient PKE Abstraction. The security proof of the main the-
orem relies on a tag-based multi-recipient public-key encryption
abstraction. As a contribution of independent interest, we show
that the variant of DHIES [2] used by the DMP to create domain
tokes satisfies this notion of security. The IND-CCA security of this
construction follows from the results in [2], together with the gen-
eral results on multi-recipient encryption in [8]. We also extend the
result to the tag-based setting of Shoup [21], in which encryption
takes a tag t and the decryption oracle permits decrypting any pair
(t , c ) , (t∗, cph∗), where (t∗, cph∗) was returned from the left-or-
right oracle. This extension is crucial to show that a malicious HSM
cannot modify an honest token to change the trust, in a way that
decrypts successfully.
5.3 Main Theorem
The proof of indistinguishability security is carried out using the
game-hopping technique. The first hop shows that the KMSDomain
Management protocol can be re-expressed using the signature ser-
vice and policymanagement abstractions introduced in the previous
subsection. This hop is conservative, and introduces no additional
terms in the security bound. The second and third hops consist
of replacing the signature abstraction and the policy management
abstraction with their ideal counterparts. These hops show that
any adversary distinguishing the two games in the hop can be used
to break the real-ideal indistinguishability guarantee for the low
level abstractions, which we showed in the previous subsection
can be, in turn, reduced to the security of standard cryptographic
primitives.
At this point we perform a conservative hop that entails the
most innovative part of the entire security proof. Here we combine
two types of reasoning: 1) the inductive argument that establishes
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the propagation of trust honesty as discussed above; and 2) the
global invariants guaranteeing the absence of collisions between
trust fingerprints, and of signature forgeries. Together, these justify
a game hop that slices the entire code of the indistinguishability
game, isolating protected (honest) trusts from the remaining ones
and enforces that the Test oracle can only be called by the adversary
on protected trusts.
Furthermore, the game no longer relies on public-key decryption
to recover domain-keys when dealing with protected trusts; instead,
it keeps a table of domain keys to answer the adversary’s challenge
queries (i.e., at this point the domain keys are still encrypted in
domain tokens, but domain tokens for protected trusts are never
explicitly decrypted). To prove this hop we formalize an invariant
(c.f. Appendix C) that establishes an equivalence between hon-
est trusts and protected trusts occurring in the game, and further
demonstrates that all trusts installed in genuine hosts are protected.
This invariant also implies consistent management of the same key
for each handle, which is necessary for indistinguishability-based
security as mentioned above.
19
At this point in the proof we can rely on the security of the multi-
recipient encryption scheme to replace the domain keys encrypted
in protected domain tokens with fixed constants. It is crucial that
there is a strict separation between protected trusts and dishon-
est trusts, since the reduction to the security of the encryption
scheme critically relies on the fact that one can use the left-or-
right challenge oracle for public-key encryption to emulate the
encryption of domain keys in protected domain tokens in both
games. Intuitively, genuine HSMs map to the (honest) public keys
in the multi-recipient public-key encryption game. CCA security of
the underlying encryption scheme permits dealing with arbitrary
InsideR queries, where one needs to decrypt ciphertexts contained
in domain tokens mauled by the adversary.
The final step in the proof shows that, at this point, the adver-
sary’s view is independent of the domain key values and hence it
has no advantage in winning the last game.
We conclude this section with the statement in EasyCrypt of the
resulting security theorem. The indistinguishability advantage is
upper-bounded by the probability that an adversary can break the
domain management policy invariant (upper-bounded in lemma
domain_management in the previous subsection), the probability that
an adversary breaks the underlying signature scheme, and the
probability that an adversary breaks the underlying multi-recipient
public-key encryption scheme. Additional negligible terms account
for the probability that the signing keys of honest parties collide
with keys that an adversary generates itself and uses as identities
for adversarially controlled operators and HSMs.
Pr[KMS_RoR(A).main():res] ≤
1 / 2 + AdvAdvMRPKE(A)
MRPKE
+ Pr[CR(AdvCR(A)).main():res] +
q_ops ∗ Pr[UF1op(AdvUF1op(A)).main():res] +






ϵ = q_hid ∗ ((q_hid + q_tkmng + q_tkmng) ∗ max_size) / n_keygen +
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To complete this hop wemade explicit a property that is implied by the unforgeability
of digital signatures, and which states that no adversary can guess the signing key of
a genuine entity before it is generated. This allowed us to show that any trust that
was declared by the game to be dishonest remains dishonest even after a new identity
key is generated.
q_ops ∗ (((q_tkmng + q_installinitial) ∗ 2 ∗ max_size) / n_keygen)
6 EASYCRYPT USAGE AND EXTENSIONS
The EasyCrypt development consists of 15K lines of code (loc),
where 500 loc correspond to the protocol specification. Additionally,
2.5K loc establish reusable definitions and supporting lemmas on
standard cryptographic primitives and EasyCrypt data structures;
5.5K loc contain definitions and general results on KMS-specific
security models; and 6.5K loc is the approximate size of the main
security proof.
The core logics of EasyCrypt proved to be expressive enough and
no exensions to these logics were needed to complete the proofs.
However, for convenience during the development, we introduced
a few new features that helped reduce the proof effort resulting
from the unprecedented scale of this project. These new features
do not enlarge the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of EasyCrypt,
which is composed of a set of base tactics defining the EasyCrypt
core logics. Indeed, all the added features generate internal proof
trees that only rely on the core tactics. Hence, no bug in the added
features could lead to the acceptance of an invalid proof tree: this
would be rejected by the TCB.
Management of pre- and post-conditions. Several core tactics re-
quire users to provide intermediate assertions, e.g. loop invariants.
When dealing with complex programs and specifications, writ-
ing such intermediate assertions becomes cumbersome and error-
prone. However, in a majority of cases, these assertions can be ex-
pressed with little work from the current pre- and post-conditions
(which tend to grow in size). We added the possibility to match
sub-formulas that appear in the current proof goal and use these
sub-formulas for new assertions. Doing this greatly decreases the
proof writing effort and makes the proof script more robust, as the
new assertion is given as a delta from the active proof goals. It also
provides more readable proof goals.
Proof automation. Several core tactics of EasyCrypt generate
proof obligations that code is lossless, i.e. that it terminates with
probability 1. We have implemented heuristics to deal with such
goals automatically.
We have also improved existing automation to chain applications
of core tactics, and tuned the implementation of some core tactics. In
particular we have integrated an automatic version of the frame rule,
which removes parts of the post-condition that are immediately
implied by the pre-condition.
7 LESSONS LEARNED
In addition to producing the machine-checked specifications and
security proofs for KMS DMP that we described in this paper,
this project was also an oportunity to better understant the chal-
lenges posed by larger-scale developments to computer-aided cryp-
tographic provable security, and particularly when using EasyCrypt.
We now give an overview of the main take-away lessons we got
from the project.
Imperative vs Functional specification. One of the strong points
of EasyCrypt is that there is a great deal of freedom in choosing
how to formalize cryptographic primitives and security games. As
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security models become more intricate, a crucial decision is how to
model the keeping of state, as there is usually a tension between
game readability and the complexity of proof goals/invariants.
Favouring game readability means using EasyCrypt’s imperative
language as much as possible to describe the step-by-step actions
that occur in each oracle call. This means using a dedicated Easy-
Crypt module to syntactically distinguish the behaviour of each
entity (or type of entity) in the system, keeping each part of the
game state as a separate local variable in the correct submodule,
and using if and while statements to deal with control-flow. The
consequence of this is that the top-level program that describes the
security experiment displays a very complex control-flow, which
makes proving the equivalences required for game-hopping harder
(in particular because game hops typically require addressing par-
ticular cases that introduce additional branching points).
The alternative is to flatten the specificacions of security exper-
iments by collapsing the module structure and moving as much
of the detail as possible to EasyCrypt operators (functional speci-
fications of deterministic state transitions). This makes the speci-
fications less readable, but it naturally provides a slicing between
probabilistic statements, which model the cryptographic opera-
tions and associated control-flow (e.g., branching on a signature
verification result) that are usually the crucial program actions in in-
distinguishability and bad-event hops, from branching and iteration
statements that are only modeling state management operations
(e.g., checking syntactic validity of a message and deciding where
it should be dispatched).
In this project we have used both approaches and, in hindsight,
the conclusion is that starting with a readable model that can be
checked for soundness more easily and then flattening it as a first
game hop is often the best choice.
Modular proofs using global invariants. A related issue in manag-
ing proof complexity is identifying early on the abstraction bound-
aries that allow decomposing the proof into treatable self-contained
intermediate goals. For some cases this is straightforward to do,
namely for sub-components in the protocol that cryptographers
naturally see as building-blocks (e.g., a signature service or a global
hash function) that give rise to simple and well-understood global
invariants in the security games. However, in this project we en-
countered protocol-specific semantically rich global invariants that
permit (once correctly identified and formalized) not only to break
the proof down into manageable subgoals, but also to simplify the
top-level proof. Intuitively, we achieved this by: i. first specifying
invariant I = I1 ∧ I2 ∧ I3 . . . globally in, say gameGi ; then ii. reduc-
ing the preservation of I in game Gi to a bad event occurring in a
simpler flattened game, where the probability of bad is bounded at
much lower cost; and iii. jumping to game Gi+1 where the preser-
vation of I is hardwired as checks of (and sometimes branching
on) some sub-formula Ik directly in the code, where needed. The
challenge here is to pin down the minimal use of Ik in the new
game, so that the invariant does not need to be reproved, while
keeping Gi+1 as simple as possible in order to complete the proof
more easily. As a side result of this design pattern, which we believe
it is interesting to generalize in future work, gameGi+1 now syntac-
tically displays only the relevant parts of the established invariant
in its code, which makes it easier to understand the context for
each proof goal.
Proof effort. Overall, from a rough analysis of the proof effort
involved in this project our intuition is that the resources required
to complete game hopping proofs by experienced EasyCrypt users,
once the games and security invariants are correctly specified (and
following good practices, some of which were highlighted above)
scales “linearly with the complexity” of the programs/games, sim-
ilarly to functional equivalence proofs between programs with a
reasonably close, if not identical, control-flow.
8 RELATEDWORK
There has been significant work on the formal verification of cryp-
tographic API, and in particular on PKCS tokens.
Delaune, Kremer, and Steel [16] model tokens as security pro-
tocols with a sole party, and apply Dolev-Yao verification meth-
ods to analyze their security. Bortolozzo, Centenaro, Focardi and
Steel [12] build an automated tool for model checking the security
and functionality of tokens, and evaluate commercially available
PKCS tokens. They discover several security issues and validate
patches.
Cachin and Chandran [13] formalize computational security of
cryptographic APIs, and show security of PKCS tokens in their
model. Kremer, Steel and Warinschi [18] define another model de-
signed to provide more genericity and to support more powerful
corruptions. Kremer, Künnemann and Steel [17] define a UC func-
tionality for key management, and use their model for proving the
security of a minimal example. The model imposes constraints on
the interactions between key management and key usage.
Shrimpton, Stam and Warinschi [23] also show that the indistin-
guishability definition of security for cryptographic APIs composes
with a natural class of symmetric-key primitives, such as AEAD
and MAC in order to provide cryptographic services. The security
of these cryptographic services was defined by extending the attack
vectors of standard AEAD and MAC security with all the oracles
available to the cryptographic API adversary. We depart from this
approach and adopt an alternative formulation for the security of
cryptographic services, which is inspired by the Universal Compos-
ability framework (UC). As discussed in Appendix A, from UC we
inherit two important advantages: i. clear composition guarantees
of cryptographic services with other systems; and ii. a clean and
intuitive view of correctness and security guarantees for the clients
of cryptographic services.
Blanchet and Chaudhuri [11] use ProVerif to analyze a protocol
for secure file sharing, which includes distributed key management
features. Their analysis is conducted in the symbolic model of
cryptography, which provides weaker guarantees, but allows for a
higher degree of automation.
CryptoVerif [9] was among the first tools to support crypto-
graphic security proofs in the computational model. It uses prob-
abilistic process algebra as a modelling language and leverages
different notions of equivalence to support proofs of equivalence,
equivalence up to failure events, as well as simple forms of hybrid
arguments. CryptoVerif has been used for verifying primitives, as
well as protocols; it was recently applied to TLS 1.3 [10].
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9 CONCLUSION
We proved a concrete security bound for the DMP of AWS KMS,
down to standard cryptographic assumptions. The bound is tight,
increasing linearly with the number of entities in the system, and
it is machine-checked in EasyCrypt. For practical purposes, our
work gives strong evidence that the DMP is as good as an ideal
encryption service, under the assumption that any quorum of AWS
operators that authorizes a domain update operation includes at
least one honest operator.
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A RELATION TO UNIVERSAL
COMPOSABILITY
Although we have not formalized it (syntactically) in this way,
our security model and proof can be recast in terms of Universal
Composability with global setup [15]. This is a framework that
extends Universal Composability to enable set-up assumptions
such as common reference strings, or public-key infrastructures
(PKI). In this setting we would consider three types of parties.
• Hosts, which provide the environment 𝒵 with the high-level
interface of AEAD encryption and decryption and enable 𝒜 to
install trusts.
• HSMs, which enable 𝒜 to update trusts and manage keys, as
well as perform encryption and decryption operations based on
requests placed by hosts.
• Operators, which enable𝒵 to generate key attestation statements
for operators and HSMs.
The proof assumes static-corruptions, whereby some parties are
known to be corrupt from the beginning of computation.
The proof of security in the UC framework would be carried out
in a hybrid model. The first hybrid functionality is a confidential
and authenticated channel through which hosts place encryption
and decryption requests to HSMs. We emphasise that this hybrid
functionality is not used by the KMS DMP protocol in any of the do-
main management operations, which are the focus of our analysis;
it captures only the architectural choice that KMS hosts collect end-
user encryption/decryption requests and forward them to HSMs
(see footnote 7). Future work will extend the proof to consider the
specific secure channel used by KMS for this purpose, which builds
on top of the DMP itself.
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Additionally the hybrid model includes two set-up assumptions.
The first set-up assumption is a standard PKI functionality that is
used only by operators, and which registers the identity keys of
genuine entities in the system; this models the real world operation
of KMS DMP in which operators are assumed to know the set of
genuine entities. A crucial aspect of the security guarantees we
prove for KMS DMP is precisely that this resource is restricted to
operators, and still it suffices to guarantee that trust honesty is
preserved by host and HSM actions.
The second set-up assumption captures the global quorum in-
variant that in any group of n genuine operators, there exists at
least one non-corrupt operator. This assumption can be modeled via
a simple hybrid functionality that is used only by hosts and HSMs.
This functionality takes a set of operator identities and returns a
single bit; the bit will be true if either the set contains a non-genuine
operator or, if this is not the case, if the invariant is satisfied. By
accessing this functionality, the description of the DMP protocol
executed by hosts and HSMs can be instrumented (as a modeling
artefact) to truncate execution traces where the global invariant is
violated.
While the PKI set-up assumption is standard for many real-world
systems, the second set-up assumption reflects a different kind of
trust assumption that arises in modeling the actions of human
operators in the UC setting.
The implication of recasting our result in the gUC framework is
that we obtain composability: any higher-level protocol that can be
proved secure by relying on the ideal encryption functionality we
defined in the main body of the paper will still be secure when this
functionality is replaced by the DMP protocol, assuming of course
that the set-up assumptions described above are satisfied and that
the deployed cryptographic schemes are secure.
B EXTENSIONS TO THE SECURITY PROOF
B.1 Access to keys in dishonest tokens
The security model in the main body of the paper underspecifies
what happens if an attacker is able to maul a non-genuine identity
into an honest trust, or convince an honest host to accept a dishon-
est trust: what it states is that, even if that were possible, the attacker
should not be able to break the secrecy of domain keys associated
with that trust. This is somewhat counterintuitive and, indeed, our
security proof establishes the stronger result that no honest trust
will ever be successfully updated to another one inhabitted by non-
genuine identities. For this reason, our machine-checked proof is
actually carried out in a stronger security model.
In this model we extend the adversarial interface in the ideal
functionality to make it explicit that, whenever the adversary suc-
ceeds in causing any of the events above, it can successfully launch
a distinguishing attack separating the real world from the ideal
world. We model this by extending the ideal functionality with
two oracles (BadEnc and BadDec) that check if a trace satisfies a
predicate honest(trace, tk, hdl, cmd) and, if this is not the case, they
execute TkReveal to obtain secret key key and answer the adver-
sary’s request by encrypting or decrypting the provided payload.
Note that, if the honest predicate is trivially true, then theBadEnc
and BadDec oracles are useless to an adversary. Conversely, exclud-
ing traces from the honest predicate explicitly rules out protocols
that allow non-honest traces to occur, as the attacker can trivially
distinguish the world from the ideal world by decrypting the ci-
phertext provided to the environment by the ideal functionality.
Our strenghthening maps to the indistinguishability definition,
where we introduced the InsideR oracle; this works as a CCA-style
oracle on dishonest tokens: it allows an attacker to reveal all keys
in tokens associated with dishonest trusts and, technically, it maps
to the CCA security of the multi-recipient encryption scheme used
by the KMS DMP. In the reduction from the UC-style definition to
the indistinguishability definition, the BadEnc and BadDec oracles
can be simulated using InsideR to obtain the key and then perform
the encryption and decryption operations.
B.2 Stronger corruption models
Although we have not formalized these extensions, it is easy to see
that our proof can be easily adapted to deal with two (apparently)
stronger corruption models. The first strengthening refers to the
possibility of using corrupt keys, i.e., allowing an attacker to re-
quest encryptions and decryptions on keys it has corrupted (prior
to legitimate usage, of course). In this case, the ideal functionality
would provide an encryption/decryption of the actual payload/ci-
phertext provided by the attacker. This has no impact in the proof
of security, as the reduction to indistinguishability can be extended
to cache corrupted keys and use them to simulate these extra calls.
The second strenghtening refers to dealing with corrupted hosts,
which might be accepting dishonest trusts and/or revealing client
payloads to the attacker; this case is similar to the previous one,
in that the ideal functionality would need to be extended to keep
track of whether these corrupt hosts were dealing with honest or
dishonest trusts, and provide ideal or real encryption accordingly.
C EXAMPLE INVARIANT IN DMP PROOF
We present here the core invariant that supports the intermediate
step in the proof of KMS DMP security, where global invariants
stemming from cryptographic security guarantees provided by low-
level components are combined with inductive properties related to
trust honesty. This invariant permits separating honest (protected)
trusts from those whomay be under adversarial control and proving
that the adversary cannot gain control over domain keys that are
initially associated to an honest trust.
The invariant relies on signedTr and signedTk predicates that allow
leveraging the authentication guarantee provided by the signature
scheme used by HSMs. Similarly, the properties of the parentTrust rela-
tion permit relying on the injectivity of trust fingerprints, which is
(computationally) guaranteed by a collision-resistant hash function.
(∗ if a trust is installed, then it is protected ∗)
(∀ hstid, hstid ∈ HstPolSrv.hosts_tr⇒
oget HstPolSrv.hosts_tr[hstid] ∈
RealTrustService.protectedTrusts){2} ∧
(∗ if a trust is protected, all its members are genuine ∗)
(∀ t, t ∈ RealTrustService.protectedTrusts⇒
all_genuine OpPolSrv.genuine t){2} ∧
(∗ if a trust has a parent, then it is not initial ∗)
(∀ t, t ∈ RealTrustService.parentTrust⇒
¬tr_initial t){2} ∧
(∗ all signed installable non initial tokens have a parent ∗)
(∀ (tk : Token), ¬tr_initial tk.tk_trust⇒
tk.tk_inst⇒ signedTk tk RealSigServ.qs⇒
tk.tk_trust ∈ RealTrustService.parentTrust){2} ∧
(∗ all signed tokens with genuine trusts have signed trusts ∗)
(∀ tk, signedTk tk RealSigServ.qs⇒
all_genuine OpPolSrv.genuine tk.tk_trust⇒
signedTr tk.tk_trust RealSigServ.qs){2} ∧
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(∗ if a trust has a parent that is all genuine, then the parent
was signed in an installable token ∗)





(∗ if a trust is protected, then it was signed
in an installable token ∗)
(∀ t, t ∈ RealTrustService.protectedTrusts⇒
signedTr t RealSigServ.qs){2} ∧
(∗ if a trust was signed in an installable token,
all its members are genuine and has
an initial trust, then it is protected ∗)




t ∈ RealTrustService.protectedTrusts){2} ∧
(∗ if a token is signed with a trust where all its members
are genuine and has an initial trust, then this trust
was installable signed. ∗)





signedTr tk.tk_trust RealSigServ.qs){2} ∧
(∗ if a trust is protected and is not initial then it has
a parent and this protected as well ∗)
(∀ t, ¬tr_initial t⇒
t ∈ RealTrustService.protectedTrusts⇒
(t ∈ RealTrustService.parentTrust ∧
oget RealTrustService.parentTrust[t] ∈
RealTrustService.protectedTrusts)){2} ∧
(∗ if a trust has a protected parent then it is protected as well ∗)
(∀ t, t ∈ RealTrustService.parentTrust⇒
oget RealTrustService.parentTrust[t] ∈
RealTrustService.protectedTrusts⇒
t ∈ RealTrustService.protectedTrusts){2} ∧
(∗ Encryptions ∗)
(∀ (tk : Token), signedTk tk RealSigServ.qs{2}⇒
tk.tk_trust ∈ RealTrustService.protectedTrusts{2}⇒
tk ∈ KMS_Procedures3.wrapped_keys{2} ∧
tk.tk_wdata.tkw_ekeys ∈
mencrypt (proj_pks (tr_mems tk.tk_trust)) (encode_tag tk.tk_trust)
(encode_ptxt (oget KMS_Procedures3.wrapped_keys{2}[tk])))
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